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In 1992, the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") instituted
a major change in policy with respect to Offer in Compromise
(OIC) agreements.' The Service now actively encourages taxpayers
to settle delinquent accounts and is willing to extinguish tax debts
of doubtful collectibility in exchange for partial payment. The new
program is designed to reduce the Service's backlog of accounts
receivable, to generate immediate revenue not otherwise available,
and to afford troubled taxpayers a fresh start. The Service's initia-
tive has been highly successful, and the volume of OIC agreements
has skyrocketed.
A technical cloud hangs over the new OIC program, however. In
the past, the Service has insisted that discharge of a tax debt
through an OIC agreement gives rise to cancellation of indebted-
ness (COD) income, or to income under the tax benefit rule. Re-
ported case law reflects both theories, but the results are in con-
flict. In its most recent decision, Yale Avenue Corp. v.
Commissioner,2 the Tax Court upheld an assessment for COD in-
come, albeit indirectly.' The Service has not indicated any change
I Internal Revenue Code § 7122.
58 T.C. 1062 (1972).
' The other three reported cases are: Eagle Asbestos & Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 348
F.2d 528 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (cancelled liability for accrued deductions on tax debt did not give
rise to income under tax benefit rule because intent of parties to OIC agreement was to
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in its position since Yale Avenue. If OIC relief is taxable, the goals
of the new program would be frustrated and the program itself en-
dangered. It would be futile for the Service to impose a second
uncollectible tax as the price for relief from the first. Moreover,
from the taxpayer's perspective the new tax debt would contradict
the promise of a fresh start.
This article offers two reasons why an OIC agreement should not
create income. The first reason derives from the principle that
COD income cannot arise unless the debtor received loan proceeds
in the form of money, goods, or services. Because taxpayers ordina-
rily do not receive any identifiable proceeds in exchange for incur-
ring a tax debt, no income can arise upon its forgiveness. This ex-
planation does not cover all situations, however, because the
taxpayer may have assumed the tax debt as a condition of acquir-
ing property," or the tax benefit rule may apply to accrued
interest.5
The second reason why OIC relief should not be taxed is that it
would lead to absurd results which neither Congress nor the par-
ties to the agreement could have intended. The paradoxical effect
of taxing tax relief results from violating a circularity principle.
Application of a rule of tax law is never treated as an item of gain
or loss and then subjected to other tax rules. An OIC agreement
can be viewed as the application of a structural tax rule, just like a
cancel all obligations to the government); Denman Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 192
F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1951) (compromise of 1941 excess profits tax liability held not a gift from
Service, but collection of best settlement obtainable from taxpayer in straitened financial
circumstances); Manhattan Soap Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 257 (1944) (cancel-
lation of accrued'and deducted manufacturers excise taxes and interest not taxable as a gift
under the doctrine of Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943)).
' See Denman, 192 F.2d at 262.
B To the extent the OIC cancels an accrued and deducted item such as interest, the COD
is a recovery of the deducted item for purposes of the tax benefit rule. See I.R.C. § 111; see
also infra Part III.D.2. An OIC agreement relates to the entire liability of the taxpayer,
including interest and ad valorem penalties. Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(c).
At least in this limited situation, the technically correct answer appears to be that COD
income is required under the tax benefit rule. This technically correct answer is negated,
however, by the other reasons for treating OIC relief as nontaxable.
6 The unintended consequences cannot be avoided even by an explicit nontaxability
clause, because I.R.C. § 7122 does not authorize the Service to compromise a tax liability
which does not arise until the following year. The Service lacks the power under any provi-
sion to waive a tax which will clearly become due. If future liability for a tax is doubtful,
assurance can be provided by means of a closing agreement under § 7121 or a private letter
ruling, but not under § 7122. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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discharge by means of a tax statute of limitations. If an OIC agree-
ment is taxable, the running of a tax statute of limitations should
also produce COD income because there appears to be no princi-
pled way to distinguish the two situations.
Turning to more concrete matters, this article observes that the
Service's enforcement efforts have been selective to a degree which
raises troubling questions of fairness. The Service has targeted tax-
payers who emerged from an OIC with loss carryforwards (NOLs)
intact and who used the NOLs to avoid tax on unexpected post-
agreement profits. Because the Service has the authority to negoti-
ate a reduction of NOLs as part of an OIC agreement, an assess-
ment of COD income after the settlement has become final has the
same effect as an illegitimate and ad hoc attempt to reopen the
agreement itself.
Loss carryforwards in this situation do present a problem, but it
does not involve COD income. Rather, the problem is one of equi-
table setoff. NOLs in effect represent a claim of the taxpayer
against the government for reduced taxes in the future. Equity
would seem to require the taxpayer to abandon some or all of these
claims as a setoff against the government's claims for past taxes,
without regard to whether the NOLs relate to accruals of the can-
celled tax debt or derive from deductions of items unrelated to the
tax debt. This article proposes that the Treasury promulgate such
regulations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Offer In Compromise Agreements
An OIC agreement is a statutory procedure whose validity de-
pends upon strict conformity to the requirements of the Code.7 If
the OIC agreement does so conform, it is also a binding contract
which is enforceable according to its terms.8 The Service is author-
ized to enter into an OIC agreement either because of doubt as to
the taxpayer's liability for the tax, or doubt as to its collectibility.9
See Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 288 (1929) (approval by an
official other than the official designated by statute renders agreement invalid).
8 See, e.g., Golub v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 935 (1974) (not officially reported) (tax-
payer who failed to make installment payment required by OIC agreement can be sued for
breach of contract without regard to statute of limitations on assessments).
' Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1. The Service has no authority to compromise a tax obligation
156 [Vol. 14:153
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This article will focus exclusively on the second type of agree-
ment,'" which is by far the more common. 1
The Service has had the authority to compromise tax debts since
the first enactment of the income tax. 12 Until recently, however,
the processing requirements for OIC agreements were slow and
cumbersome, and relatively few taxpayers took advantage of the
procedure.' s The Service announced an entirely new OIC program
in 1991 which allows collection personnel vastly greater flexibility
to negotiate OIC agreements.' The program was adopted largely
in response to prodding by the General Accounting Office (GAO).
During the 1980s, the GAO made a series of reports to Congress
asserting that the Service's backlog of uncollectible accounts re-
ceivable was unacceptably large and growing ominously.' 5 In addi-
tion to urging better accounting controls, the GAO recommended
that the Service settle more of its delinquent accounts in a busi-
nesslike way in order to realize at least some revenue and to reduce
the backlog. The Service has added to these goals the commenda-
ble policy of providing taxpayers with a fresh start. This will en-
able taxpayers who are hopelessly in arrears to reenter .the system
as current contributors.' 6 The initiative has resulted in a cultural
which is certain and which is collectible. Id. Hardship is not a factor which may be consid-
ered if the debt is collectible.
This regulation derives from two 1933 opinions of the Attorney General construing the
statutory predecessor of current I.R.C. § 7122 (§ 3229 of 1933 Revised Statutes). The opin-
ions are reported as Op. A.G. 6, XIII-2 C.B. 442 (1934) and Op. A.G. 7, XIII-2 C.B. 445
(1934).
10 Where liability is in doubt, a compromise raises no issue of COD income because the
cancellation will be subject to the disputed debt doctrine. See infra note 32.
" See Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure T 15.03[4][a] (2d ed. 1991).
" Such authority existed at least as far back as 1868. See Jacob S. Seidman, Seidman's
Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws 1861-1938, at 1055 (1938).
13 See generally Daniel T. Maggs, Section 7122 of the Internal Revenue Code: The Offer
in Compromise, 11 Gonz. L. Rev. 481 (1976).
" See Saltzman, supra note 11, at 115.03[4] [a] (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. No. 1 1993). Author-
ity to accept an OIC was formerly restricted to the Chief, Collection Division. Under Deleg.
Order No. 11 (Rev. 23, Dec. 7, 1993). Now, however, acceptance authority for liabilities of
$100,000 or less has been delegated to Collection Field Branch Chiefs, two management
levels below. See also James Bitoni & Melissa Kearney, Offers in Compromise, A.B.A. Sec.
Tax'n, Midyear Meeting, at 157 (1994).
1 See Rita Zeidner, Taxpayer Debts Put IRS in Compromising Position, 57 Tax Notes
161, 162 (Oct. 12, 1992). See also David Grossman, Offers in Compromise-Past and Pre-
sent: Changes to the Internal Revenue Service's Offer in Compromise Policy 1 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
10 See I.R.S. Doc. No. 7917, Highlights of the Offers in Compromise Program, at 2-3 (Feb.
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sea change within the Service. Traditional unbudging attitudes to-
ward collection have given way to an official policy of compromise
and accommodation.
17
The Service has been very successful in encouraging taxpayers to
submit OICs under the new program. Both the volume of OICs and
the rate of acceptance rose dramatically in the program's first full
year.' Similar increases are expected in 1994.19 Thus, the question
whether an OIC agreement has further tax consequences is of great
importance to an ever-increasing number of taxpayers.
Because the question requires exploration into the theory of
COD income, it is appropriate to begin with the origins of COD
doctrine.
B. KIRBY LUMBER and its Progeny
In 1921, the Treasury first published regulations asserting that
gains from a taxpayer's repurchase of its own bonds were taxable,2 0
and that forgiveness of other debts was taxable as well.2 1 The
courts did not agree, and consistently held against the government
on the ground that gain from debt cancellation does not provide
1992). See also I.R.S. Policy Statement P-5-100 (Jan. 30, 1992); I.R.S. Manual § 57(10)1.1
(Feb. 26, 1992).
'7 Robert Wenzel, Assistant Commissioner, Collections, announced at the midyear meet-
ing of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association on January 29, 1994 that 6,000
revenue officers have already been trained in the new procedures. Among other changes,
revenue officers are now instructed to inform taxpayers of the OIC program, to help taxpay-
ers file the necessary paperwork, and to suggest sources of funds from which to make the
offer.
"' According to I.R.S. News Release IR-93-45 (May 17, 1993), the volume of offers re-
ceived rose by 104% from Fiscal Year ("FY") 1991 to 1992, from 8,711 to 17,749; of these
the number accepted went up by 118% from 1,995 to 4,356; the rate of acceptance increased
from 25% to 45%, and the dollar volume nearly tripled from $37 to $106 million. Id.
Comparing the first six months of FY-93 with the same period of FY-92, the increases are
still more dramatic. Offers received increased by 323%, offers accepted by 377%, and the
rate of acceptance rose to 55%. Id. Some geographic unevenness has been reported, how-
ever. See George Guttman, Compromise Offer Acceptance Rates Vary by Location, 62 Tax
Notes 257, 257-67 (Jan. 17, 1994).
The average amount received by the Service has dropped from $.25 - $.30 per dollar com-
promised in FY-91 to $.15. Id. at 266. The decline is probably due to a more businesslike
treatment of inflated assessments which were never realistically payable in the first place.
Id.
' Wenzel, supra note 17, estimated that about 60,000 OIC's would be processed in FY-94.
20 Treas. Reg. § 45 (1921).
21 Id.
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the taxpayer with any money or property and is therefore
equivalent to unrealized appreciation.2 2 The government's position
was not vindicated until 1931, when the Supreme Court held in
United States v. Kirby Lumber2 3  that a solvent corporation's
profit from repurchase of its own bonds at a discount on the open
market was taxable because it produced a "freeing-up of assets"
and a "clear gain."2'
The government immediately interpreted Kirby Lumber as vin-
dicating its longstanding position that cancellation of any and all
other debts is taxable as well. This sweeping interpretation hardly
follows from the holding in Kirby Lumber 5 but it has never been
22 The early decisions invoked the definition of income in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189 (1920), which on constitutional grounds had limited income to gains in the form of
money or property which are fully realized. Mere balance-sheet improvement resulting from
COD was not regarded as such gain. See, e.g., Kerbaugh-Empire Co. v. Bowers, 300 F. 938
(S.D.N.Y. 1924), (bargain discharge of loan with depreciated foreign currency was not real-
ized gain from labor or capital), aff'd on other grounds, 271 U.S. 170 (1926); Meyer Jewelry
Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 1319, 1322 (1926) (forgiveness of 40% of taxpayer's debts
through composition with creditors not realized gain).
Although the unrealized appreciation theory of these cases has been eclipsed by United
States v. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. 1 (1931), the theory survives indirectly in the form of
various elections or requirements of the taxpayer to reduce basis in property as an alterna-
tive to current taxability of COD. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
23 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
24 Id. at 3. The transaction in Kirby Lumber resembled a short sale, and would have
resulted in gain no matter what was sold and repurchased at a profit, except for the corpo-
ration's own stock, which was protected by the predecessor of I.R.C. § 1032.
Gains from repurchase of bonds seem very similar to gains from repurchase of stock, and
thus it is not clear why the immunity of § 1032 was not extended to transactions like that in
Kirby Lumber. There would be no apparent abuse potential in such a rule. Ordinarily, the
conditions which reduce the market value of corporate debt are either outside the corpora-
tion's control (increases in general interest rates), or undesirable to create (increased risk
due to decline in corporate prospects).
If recognition of gain is justified, it is unclear why such gain should not be treated as
capital gain from a short sale, rather than ordinary income.
"8 This was a very expansive reading of a very narrow decision. The decision did not even
mention discharge of indebtedness, much less announce any general rule on the subject.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear why the gain in Kirby Lumber was regarded as a dis-
charge of debt rather than as gain from a securities transaction.
Most cancellations of debt bear no resemblance to the Kirby Lumber situation. Kirby
Lumber cancelled its own debt (if that is what it did) in an anonymous securities transac-
tion which was completely voluntary on both sides. By contrast, most other kinds of debt
cancellation are caused by the debtor's inability or unwillingness to pay, and involve some
degree of dispute which must be resolved through compromise, coercion, or resignation to
the inevitable.
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seriously questioned.2 6 It is perhaps worth pointing out that other
countries which impose a tax in the Kirby Lumber situation of
open market trading profits generally do not extend the rule to
negotiated relief from indebtedness.27
The government has always allowed exceptions if the taxpayer is
insolvent or bankrupt,2 8 or where the cancellation is in effect a gift
or a contribution to the capital of a corporation.2 9 The courts, in
turn, quickly added other exceptions for purchase price adjust-
ments,30 exchanges of stock to retire debt, 1 disputed or contingent
debts, 2 and debts incurred without consideration received.33
26 Unless the "commercial gift" doctrine of Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S.
322 (1943) can be so construed. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
27 Discharge of indebtedness is not taxable in the U.K. See British Mexican Petroleum
Co. v. Commissioners, 16 T.C. 570 (H.L. 1932); Butterworths U.K. Tax Guide 2:14 (1992).
Similarly, in Germany, COD is not taxable at all to individuals, nor to corporations if the
forgiveness is intended to rehabilitate the debtor ("Sanierungsgewinn") and the forgiveness
is substantially uniform among creditors. There is no price to be paid under German law in
the form of loss of basis or other attributes. See Einkommensteuergesetz § 3(66); Koerper-
schaftsteuerrichtlinien § 26(1)(1). In Canada, COD is not taxable, but attribute reductions
similar to I.R.C. § 108(b) are required instead. See Stikeman, Income Tax Act Annotated
§ 80(1) (1990). In France, however, COD is taxable, but only if it arises in connection with a
trade or business. See Memento Pratique Francis Lefebvre $ 668.
28 The government had ruled long before Kirby Lumber that discharges in bankruptcy do
not trigger COD income. I.T. 1564, 11-1 C.B. 59 (1923). The following year it expanded the
ruling to include discharges through composition with creditors if the taxpayer is left with-
out assets. S.M. 1495, IlI-1 C.B. 108 (1924).
29 These exceptions were already included in Treas. Reg. § 45 (1918). The regulations in
effect acknowledge that forgiveness of debt may be an indirect method of effecting a pay-
ment to the debtor, and that such an indirect payment should be treated for tax purposes in
the same manner as if the payment had been made directly. Such indirect payments have
been aptly termed "spurious" COD, because the debt is not cancelled, but paid in full. See
Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts T 6.4.4
(2d. ed. 1990).
'0 Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940) (where taxpayer acquired prop-
erty for cash and assumption of existing debt and property later declined in value, mortga-
gee's agreement to accept less than remaining balance in full satisfaction of debt was non-
taxable price reduction, not COD income). A safe harbor for such price adjustments was
codified in 1954 under I.R.C. § 108(e)(5).
"' Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corp., 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944) (taxpayer's is-
suance of stock to retire bonded debt held not taxable but a mere change in form of its
continuing liability).
22 N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939) (cancellation of purchase-money
debt for purchase of stock which became worthless not taxable as dispute over securities
fraud). The case might just as well have been decided under the purchase-price adjustment
exception. See supra note 30.
Decisional law regarding the disputed debt doctrine is sparse but controversial. For a fas-
cinating example of confusion in this area, see Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
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The rule of Kirby Lumber was first codified in the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954 section 61(a)(12). 34 This had no appreciable ef-
fect upon the law, and the existing judge-made exceptions contin-
ued in effect as before. 35 Many, but not all of the exceptions were
later codified in 1980 under section 108 of the Code. 6
Under present law, bankrupt and insolvent taxpayers are not re-
quired to recognize COD income currently.3 7 Instead, the tax is de-
ferred by mandatory reduction of the taxpayer's NOLs and other
1990) (compromise of gambler's casino debt of $3.4 million for $500,000 did not create COD
income because debt was disputed and of doubtful enforceability under New Jersey statute
prohibiting casino from extending excessive credit), rev'g 92 T.C. 1084 (1990). See also
Daniel N. Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the Measure-
ment of Taxable Consumption, 45 Tax L. Rev. 215 (1990); Joseph M. Dodge, Zarin v. Com-
missioner: Musings About Debt Cancellations and "Consumption" in an Income Tax Base,
45 Tax L. Rev. 677 (1990); Calvin H. Johnson, Zarin and the Tax Benefit Rule: Tax Models
for Gambling Losses and the Forgiveness of Gambling Debts, 45 Tax L. Rev. 697 (1990);
Daniel N. Shaviro, Psychic Income Revisited: Response to Professors Johnson and Dodge,
45 Tax L. Rev. 707 (1990); Alan Gunn, Another Look at the Zarin Case, 50(8) Tax Notes
893 (Feb. 25, 1991).
The commentators are about evenly divided as to whether Zarin should have been taxed.
It is doubtful whether Zarin was a case of COD income at all. The purpose and effect of the
New Jersey statute was to cancel the gambling losses as unfairly incurred by the casino's
overreaching. Zarin simply got his money back. See Johnson, supra.
13 Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932) (repurchase of bonds for less
than par not taxable where bonds had been issued as a dividend and without value re-
ceived). This latter exception is of particular significance for this article. See infra Part
III.A.
"4 The codification was accomplished by adding to the list of items of gross income under
I.R.C. § 61(a) "(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness."
" The House attempted to codify the existing exceptions and liberalized several of them,
but the Senate Finance Committee rejected the changes and decided to leave matters "to be
settled according to rules developed by the courts." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14,
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4643. See Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Income from the Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber
Co., 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1159, 1180 n.79 (1978); James S. Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness
and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 Tax L. Rev. 225, 275
(1959).
6 The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 ("BRTA 1980")
codified the exceptions for insolvency, and for stock-for-debt exchanges. The exception for
debts incurred without consideration was not codified, nor was the exception for disputed or
contingent debts. The exception for purchase price adjustments was codified only in part in
the form of a safe harbor under I.R.C. § 108(e)(5).
" I.R.C. § 108(a). A taxpayer outside of formal bankruptcy proceedings is taxed cur-
rently, however, to the extent it is or becomes solvent as a result of a composition agree-
ment. Solvency for this purpose is measured by the excess of the value of the taxpayer's
assets over the taxpayer's remaining indebtedness. I.R.C. § 108(d)(3).
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valuable tax attributes.3 s If the taxpayer has none, the immunity is
in effect permanent.3 9 Congress has frequently changed the law in
this area, but has been unable to strike a satisfactory balance be-
tween the interests of debtors, creditors, and the fisc.4 °
Solvent taxpayers must generally recognize COD currently, even
if they remain financially troubled. Under former law, an election
was generally available to solvent taxpayers to defer tax by reduc-
ing the basis of their assets instead.4 1 The election was repealed in
1986,42 and is currently available only to farmers 43 and taxpayers
in the real estate business." Congress has frequently oscillated
38 I.R.C. § 108(b). From 1939 until 1980, however, the sole price of forgiveness of COD
income for insolvent and bankrupt taxpayers was a reduction of the taxpayer's basis in its
assets. BRTA 1980 steeply increased the price by requiring a reduction of NOLs and other
tax attributes in a fixed order, beginning with (i) NOLs, then (ii) tax credits, (iii) capital
losses, (iv) reduction of basis of depreciable and nondepreciable property, and (v) foreign
tax credit carryovers. For details of prior law, see Eustice, supra note 35, at 254-64, 276-77.
The list of tax attributes subject to reduction was recently expanded by the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66 ("OBRA 1993") to include minimum
tax credits and passive activity losses and credit carryovers.
39 A similar permanent immunity occurs if the taxpayer has insufficient attributes to ab-
sorb the COD in full, or if reduction does not increase future taxes. Thus some insolvent
taxpayers must pay a price for relief from debt, but not others. True deferral would require
all taxpayers to pay the tax on COD income at some point in the future.
40 Attribute reduction under I.R.C. § 108(b) was designed to tax the debtor by deferral,
but the actual incidence of the tax is more likely to fall on creditors instead. Tax attributes,
especially NOLs, usually increase the ability of the debtor to pay its creditors. See Robin E.
Phelan & William M. Sharp, Kick 'Em While They're Down - A Taxation and Bankruptcy
Critique of the Technical and Policy Aspects of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 35 Sw. L.J.
833, 876-78 (1981).
11 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(c) (repealed in 1986). The election was first enacted in 1939 for cor-
porations and was extended to individuals in 1954. Thus, before BRTA 1980, insolvent and
solvent taxpayers were treated roughly alike to the extent the election was available to sol-
vent taxpayers. See supra note 38. The election was limited to business-related debt and
was subject to constantly changing restrictions. For details of prior law, see Eustice, supra
note 35, 254-64 and 276-77; Fred T. Witt, Jr., & William H. Lyons, An Examination of the
Tax Consequences of Discharge of Indebtedness, 10 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 42-43 (1990).
42 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 822(c), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
'I .R.C. § 108(g). COD of farmers was excepted from the 1986 repeal of the election to
reduce basis. This was a complete flip-flop, because farmers had not generally been eligible
for the election provided in BRTA 1980 due to the fact that farmland is nondepreciable.
Thus, in 1986 most non-farm businesses lost their election, and farmers who had not previ-
ously enjoyed the election first acquired it. See generally Dirk A. Williams, The Qualified
Farm Indebtedness Exception to Discharged Debt: Making Hay Under TRA, 50 Mont. L.
Rev. 279 (1989).
" I.R.C. §§ 108(a)(1)(D), (c) (1993). OBRA 1993 revived the election to reduce basis, but
only for non-corporate debts incurred in the business of real estate. Like the exception for
farmers, the election applies only to the extent the taxpayer has qualifying basis which can
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without apparent reason between taxing solvent taxpayers cur-
rently, and allowing basis reduction instead.45 The present state of
the law of COD income is unstable and in great confusion.46
1. Tax Treatment of OIC Agreements
There are four reported decisions in which the issue of COD in-
come has arisen in connection with an OIC agreement. The first
was Manhattan Soap Co. v. Commissioner,47 in which cancellation
of accrued and deducted manufacturer's excise taxes and interest
was held to be gratuitous and thus a nontaxable gift under the au-
thority of the Supreme Court's decision in Helvering v. American
Dental Co.48 The commercial gift doctrine was short-lived, 4 and it
is doubtful that decisions made under the authority of American
Dental have any continuing validity.5" The second decision was
be reduced, but unlike the exception for farmers, the property must be depreciable.
'5 It seems irrational to condition availability of the election upon the taxpayer's line of
business. See supra notes 43-44.
46 For a comprehensive review of the law of COD income, see Chris Trower, Federal Tax-
ation of Bankruptcy and Workouts (1993). See also Witt & Lyons, supra note 41, at 1. A
thorough analysis of the dismaying degree of uncertainty surrounding I.R.C. § 108 may be
found in Fred T. Witt, Jr., Report of the Section 108 Real Estate and Partnership Tax
Force, Part I, 46(1) Tax Law. 209 (1992) and Part II, 46(2) Tax Law. 397 (1993).
For problems under the 1954 Code, see Eustice, supra note 35; Victoria Powell, A Review
of Judicial Exceptions to the Kirby Lumber Rule, 30 Fla. L. Rev. 94 (1977); Phelan &
Sharp, supra note 40.
New problems appear as Congress relentlessly extends the reach of debt discharge income
with each new tax act. OBRA 1993 made two such amendments. First, attribute reduction
was enacted, without public debate, for stock-for-debt exchanges of insolvent corporations.
The new rule has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Cancellation of Indebtedness - Stock-
for-Debt Exception, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 59 Tax Notes 573 (Apr.
26, 1993). Second, new I.R.C. § 6050P requires lending institutions to report COD of $600
or more without regard to whether the bankruptcy exception (or any other exceptions)
might apply. Because most COD is excludible under the I.R.C. § 108(a) bankruptcy/insol-
vency exception, the reporting requirement seems very likely to impose far greater compli-
ance costs on banks and thrifts than any revenue it might raise. The reports to debtors are
also likely to create unnecessary confusion and friction with the Service.
" 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 257 (1944).
48 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
4' American Dental was effectively overruled only six years later in United States v.
Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949) (discount repurchase of financially distressed individual's debt
not a gift, but best available settlement).
Manhattan Soap was also found to be insolvent both before and after the cancellation, so
that no income would have arisen in any event under the doctrine of Lakeland Grocery Co.
v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937), which is now codified at I.R.C. § 108(d)(3).
60 Professor Eustice has written that Manhattan Soap was "the height of absurdity."
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Denman Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner," in which the gov-
ernment compromised a 1941 liability for accrued and deducted
manufacturers' excess profits taxes and interest. The court noted
the demise of American Dental and held that the cancellation was
not a gift, but rather a collection of the best settlement obtainable
from a taxpayer in straitened financial circumstances. The court
found Denman to be solvent and upheld the assessment for COD
income.52
Next came Eagle Asbestos & Packing Co. v. Commissioner," in
which unpaid income and excess profits taxes were cancelled to-
gether with interest on the tax debts. The Service invoked the tax
benefit rule and assessed taxes only for the cancelled interest, not
the cancelled principal. 4 The Court of Claims decided the case by
analyzing the OIC agreement as a contract, and held that the tax
benefit rule did not apply because the intent of the contracting
parties was to extinguish all obligations to the government.5 5 The
Eagle Asbestos court did not cite either Manhattan Soap or Den-
man, perhaps because the earlier cases involved assessments on the
theory of COD income rather than the tax benefit rule.56
The most recent decision was Yale Avenue v. Commissioner,57 in
Eustice, supra note 35, at 249. Indeed, it was as if the tax collector is viewed as making a
gift out of detached and disinterested generosity. But, if the purpose of tax forgiveness was
to allow Manhattan Soap to continue in business and provide employment and tax revenues
in the future, the forgiveness might be viewed as a contribution to capital. From this per-
spective, tax-free treatment seems perfectly natural.
If the creditor has a continuing financial interest in the debtor, say as a regular customer,
supplier or tenant, as was the case in American Dental, it is not unreasonable to regard a
cancellation of debt as a tax-free contribution to the debtor's capital even where the creditor
has no proprietary interest in the debtor. Such a rule was in fact proposed in the House bill
which led to the 1954 Code, but was dropped by the Senate. Section 76(a)(3) of Proposed
House Bill 8300, H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess. 12 (1954).
This is also the rule under the German income tax. See supra note 27.
192 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1951), aff'g 44 T.C. 706 (1950).
82 Another issue was raised in the court below but dropped on appeal, which was whether
the debt was subject to the exception for purchase price adjustments now codified at I.R.C.
§ 108(e)(5). See infra Part III.D.
The Denman case is usually cited for a third issue, however. That was whether Denman's
election to reduce its basis in corporate assets was timely and thus effective to avoid current
COD income.
58 348 F.2d 528 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
See I.R.C. § 111. See also infra Part III.D.2.
88 The contract issues are explored in more depth infra Part IV.A.1.
88 In the Eagle Asbestos situation, the two rules overlap. See infra note 152.
87 58 T.C. 1062 (1972).
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which the parties had stipulated that COD income would arise un-
less the taxpayer was insolvent. The court found the taxpayer to
be solvent and upheld the assessment. The facts indicate that Yale
Avenue paid the principal amount of tax in full and that the OIC
agreement cancelled only accrued interest. Although the factual
situation was on all fours with Eagle Asbestos, the Yale Avenue
court did not cite it, nor did it mention the tax benefit rule.
Because the Service has published nothing in this area since
Yale Avenue, its litigating position apparently remains that an
OIC agreement is taxable.
III. Is CANCELLATION OF A TAX DEBT INCOME?
Part A of this section will establish that COD income cannot
arise unless the debtor originally received loan proceeds in ex-
change for incurrence of the cancelled debt. Part B argues that
taxpayers generally do not receive any such loan proceeds in ex-
change for incurring tax liabilities. Counterarguments to Part B
are discussed and rejected in Part C, and Part D explores two lim-
ited exceptions in which taxpayers do receive loan proceeds or
their equivalent.
A. Requirement of Otherwise Taxable Loan Proceeds
The most satisfactory explanation of why debt discharge should
be treated as income or gain is a tax benefit argument. Receipt of
borrowed money is excludible because it must be repaid. Forgive-
ness of the debt at a later date is inconsistent with the reason for
the initial exclusion, and should therefore result in gross income.5
From this point of view, COD income may be seen as a variant of
the tax benefit rule.59 The prior tax benefit is the exclusion which
should be reversed when it becomes clear that the funds will not
be repaid. It follows from the tax benefit principle that to the ex-
58 This explanation is most forcefully argued in Bittker & Thompson, supra note 35. A
more direct approach would be to tax the loan proceeds in the year of receipt, but in many
instances that year would be closed by the statute of limitations. I.R.C. § 111 similarly cre-
ates income in the year of recovery, and does not reverse deductions of prior years.
59 For this view see Louis A. Del Cotto, Debt Discharge Income: Kirby Lumber Co. Revis-
ited Under the "Transactional Equity" Rule of Hillsboro, 38 Buff. L. Rev. 777 (1990). The
similarity to the tax benefit rule is theoretical only, however. The practical realities are
quite different. The tax benefit rule usually (but not necessarily) involves a recovery of cash
which increases the taxpayer's present ability to pay, but the COD rule does not.
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tent the debtor did not originally receive cash or other loan pro-
ceeds in exchange for incurring the debt, its cancellation should
not be taxable.60
The Code does not provide an adequate definition of "indebted-
ness" under section 61(a)(12) e1 or any other section of the Code.62
Section 61(a)(12) does not explicitly limit "indebtedness" to debt
incurred in exchange for value, nor did Kirby Lumber's "freeing of
assets" theory imply such a requirement. Read literally, the Code
treats all cancellation of debt as income, and because all relief
from debt does undeniably improve the debtor's economic condi-
tion, such a literal interpretation is not inherently implausible. On
the other hand, the economic benefit of COD should not automati-
cally be regarded as profit or gain for tax purposes, because the
benefit may be equivalent to a tax-free return of capital.63 If the
60 Bittker & Lokken put the case succinctly that "[i]n actuality, income results from the
discharge of indebtedness because the taxpayer has received more than is paid back.
Bittker & Lokken, supra note 29, 6.4.1, at 6-31.
The outer limits of what constitutes "indebtedness" under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) are
murky. In circular fashion, the statute defines "indebtedness" at I.R.C. §§ 108(d)(1)(A), (B)
as including "any indebtedness for which the taxpayer is liable," and "any indebtedness
subject to which the taxpayer holds property."
Treas. Reg. § 1.108(b)-l(c), which is no longer in effect, provided a more illuminating, but
still inadequate definition:
(c) As used in 108(b) and this section, the term "indebtedness" means an obligation, abso-
lute and not contingent, to pay on demand or within a given time, in cash or another me-
dium, a fixed amount.
This regulation interpreted former I.R.C. § 108(b), repealed in 1976, which applied by its
terms only to railroad corporations. It has been asserted (without examples, however) that
this definition has effectively been adopted by the courts for purposes of I.R.C. § 61(a)(12)
generally. Bittker & Lokken, supra note 29, at T 6.4.2. The definition does not address the
loan proceeds problem.
"2 Unsuccessful attempts at formulating proposed regulations defining debt have been
made and withdrawn again under I.R.C. §§ 385 and 752, for the purposes of distinguishing
corporate equity from debt, and distinguishing debt which increases a partner's basis in a
partnership from debt which does not. It is not clear that a general definition of debt would
be useful, because different problem areas probably require different solutions. For exam-
ple, neither of the proposed regulations above would have provided useful guidance on the
questions of loan proceeds arising under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). Much of the doubt and confu-
sion described in the text might be avoidable if Congress provided a carefully limited defini-
tion under § 61(a)(12), or if the Treasury promulgated regulations to rationalize the existing
case law.
63 Indeed, cancellation of debt often has the intended effect of a reimbursement of loss
which is economically a return of capital. Where this is the case, the COD should be taxfree.
For example, under the law of securities fraud, a purchase-money debt for securities may be
unenforceable due to the seller's noncompliance with applicable securities regulation. Can-
celling such a debt has the same economic effect as recovery of a cash loss from securities
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debtor buys or borrows nothing in exchange, incurrence of a debt
is a loss of net worth. Cancellation of such a debt does no more
than restore former net worth," and is not gain for precisely the
same reason that a return of capital is not gain.
The tax benefit explanation implies that even if the debtor does
receive value, no COD income should arise unless that value would
have been taxable absent the debt. If the value received would
have been excludible in any case, the debt provided no prior tax
benefit, and its cancellation creates no inconsistency. I will refer to
this as the requirement of a "debt-related" exclusion.
Under case law, COD income may arise from discharge of debts
incurred for property as well as cash. 5 There are no cases reported
where services have been treated as loan proceeds, unless interest
or rent is considered a service charge for providing the use of capi-
tal or other property. 8 Logically, services should be treated in the
fraud through a suit for rescission or damages, and in both cases the relief is taxfree. Com-
pare Sobel, supra note 32 (cancellation of debt for worthless stock sold in violation of Blue
Sky law not taxable) with Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943) (cash recovery of
loss due to securities fraud excluded as return of capital).
A similar point was overlooked in the Zarin litigation. Under the anti-gambling law of at
least four states, cash gambling losses are recoverable from the winner if a timely claim is
made. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Title XXX, Chap. 372.020; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Title
XXXI, Chap. 338:1; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.740; and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-19-104. There can
be little doubt that recovery of a loss under such a statute would be excludible for tax
purposes as a return of capital. The same would be true for recovery of a gambling loss by
means of a suit based on common law fraud. If recovery of a cash gambling loss is a tax-free
return of capital, it follows that cancellation of an unpaid gambling debt pursuant to anti-
gambling law must also be taxfree to the debtor. If it were not, the debtor could achieve the
same tax-free result simply by paying the gambling debt and recovering it again as damages.
Transactions which are economically identical should not be taxed differently.
64 By contrast, if the debtor borrows value equal to the amount of debt, the debtor's net
worth is unchanged by the borrowing, and discharge of the debt increases the borrower's net
worth.
05 In other words, the symmetry theory of COD appears to apply to purchases of goods or
services through borrowing, as well as to cash loans. It is worth noting that Kirby Lumber's
bonds were not issued for cash, but to retire preferred stock with dividend arrearages. This
fact was not mentioned in the decision. See Boris I. Bittker, Income from the Cancellation
of Indebtedness: A Historical Footnote to the Kirby Lumber Co. Case, 4 J.Corp. Tax'n 124,
126 (1977).
However, in subsequent decisions involving bonds issued for preferred stock, the courts
have held that the measure of loan proceeds is the cash originally received for the preferred
stock, not the value of the preferred stock at the time of its exchange for the bonds. See
United States Steel v. United States, 848 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
6 Forgiven debts for rent or interest has been held to be taxable only if the taxpayer had
accrued and deducted the expense with tax benefit. See Rev. Rul. 67-200, 1967-1 C.B. 15.
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same way as money or property, 7 but practical reasons have prob-
ably prevented cases from arising. Services are generally paid for
when performed rather than over time,6 and thus if an obligation
for services is cancelled, the reason is likely to be a dispute or price
adjustment, rather than inability to pay.69
See also infra Part III.D.2. No authority seems to be reported on the question whether can-
celled debts for interest trigger COD income if the interest was nondeductible. Arguably, the
forgiveness might be taxfree if it can be regarded as a price reduction for the service of
providing funds. The same uncertainty exists for other services which are nondeductible,
such as a debt for personal rent. However, if payment for the services would be deductible
by a cash-method taxpayer, the COD is excluded under I.R.C. § 108(e)(2).
It is improbable that services were the consideration for the debts in Zarin, despite the
assertion by many commentators that Zarin's debts at craps were for consumption of the
casino's gambling services. Casinos bet against customers directly, and do not provide bet-
ting "services" other than those necessary to complete the betting transactions. The point of
gambling is not to purchase the services of a croupier. That is like saying investors buy
securities in order to enjoy the services of a broker.
67 Thus, in principle, compromise of a fixed liability in liquidated amount for nondeduct-
ible legal, medical or educational services should be taxable.
68 An exception is educational loans. Such loans should logically create COD income when
cancelled, unless the cancellation has the intended effect of providing a tax-free scholarship.
However, in Porten v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. 1993-73, forgiveness of a college tuition
loan pursuant to a program intended by the State of Alaska as a tax-free educational grant
was held to be taxable on the ground that forgiveness was conditioned on the borrower's
continuing residency in Alaska. The Porten case appears to be wrongly decided. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.117-4(c) clearly intend disallowance of the scholarship exclusion only where the scholar-
ship is earned through "employment" services or services "subject to the direction or super-
vision of the grantor." Mere residency cannot be regarded as providing such services to the
State of Alaska.
I.R.C. § 108(f) excludes from income forgiveness of student loans pursuant to certain pro-
fessional training programs, chiefly in medicine, and seems to imply that absent the provi-
sion, the forgiveness would be taxable as COD income. Actually, however, the forgiveness to
which § 108(f) applies is a species of "spurious" COD income. See supra note 29. Typically,
the beneficiary must earn the forgiveness by practicing medicine in an underserved area for
some number of years, and thus indirectly repays the loans in full. The tax prevented by
§ 108(f) rests upon income from compensation, rather than COD. This was correctly ana-
lyzed in Rev. Rul. 73-256, 1973-1 C.B. 56, published before enactment of § 108(f).
69 It was perhaps for these reasons that the American Law Institute's Draft of a Federal
Income Tax Statute proposed a codification of the COD income rules which would have
defined "indebtedness" as including only those obligations which are incurred for cash, or
for the acquisition of property where the debt was included in basis. See Stanley S. Surrey
& William C. Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute: Gross In-
come, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 Harv. L.
Rev. 761, 816 (1953).
Note also that purchased services ordinarily have no basis to adjust in lieu of current
taxability. A taxpayer might have basis in prepaid services to be received in the future, but
if the liability to pay for them is cancelled before performance, it is unlikely that the ser-
vices will actually be received.
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The courts have consistently refused to tax COD in the absence
of loan proceeds since the issue was first litigated in 1932. The
leading case is Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co.,70 decided less than
a year after Kirby Lumber. Rail Joint had issued a dividend to its
shareholders in the form of its own bonds and subsequently re-
deemed some of the bonds for less than par. The Second Circuit
held that Rail Joint realized no gain because it had received noth-
ing of value in exchange for the original issuance of the bonds.7 1 In
Aftergood v. Commissioner,71 an accommodation guarantor who
originally received nothing of value for the guarantee and who set-
tled the resulting liability for less than the full amount owed did
not incur COD income for the amount compromised.7 3 Presuma-
bly, it is the primary obligor who incurs COD income to the extent
of money received, but not repaid.7' In Bradford v. Commis-
7" 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932).
" The decision has been attacked on the ground that the transaction had the same eco-
nomic effect as if the corporation first sold its bonds to the public, and then paid the pro-
ceeds to its shareholders as a dividend. See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 35, at 1167.
Their analysis has been persuasively criticized on the ground that the transactions are not
equivalent: a bond dividend merely promises shareholders a future benefit, whereas a sale of
bonds to the public and distribution of the proceeds to shareholders effects a present trans-
fer of wealth from outsiders to the corporate shareholders. See Alan Gunn, Reconciling
United States Steel and Kirby Lumber, 50 Tax Notes 851, 852 n.10 (Feb. 13, 1989)
The result in Rail Joint has also been questioned on the related and equally dubious
ground that payment of a dividend is the corporate equivalent of "consumption" because
the corporation enjoyed the benefits of making a payment which normally can be done only
with money or money's worth. See Del Cotto, supra note 59, at 792.
It should be observed that these objections do not concern whether I.R.C. § 61(a)(12)
requires a prior receipt of loan proceeds, but only whether Rail Joint should be regarded as
having in fact received value equivalent to loan proceeds under the circumstances.
" 21 T.C. 60 (1953), acq in result 1954-1 C.B. 3.
'3 Settlement of the guarantor's $5,000 accommodation note for $2,000 did not result in
$3,000 of COD income. Rather, he was entitled instead to a nonbusiness bad debt deduction
for the $2,000 paid in compromise. The guarantor has not made a gain; he has merely
avoided a further loss. Cf. Hunt v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 635, 649-50 (1990):
Payment by the principal debtor does not increase the guarantor's net worth; it
merely prevents it, pro tanto, from being decreased. The guarantor no more realizes
income from the transaction than he would if a tornado, bearing down on his house
and threatening a loss, changes course and leaves the house intact.
Id.
" It may be argued that although an accommodation guarantor does not receive cash or
property, some benefit must be received. The guarantor's purpose may be to benefit a re-
lated business enterprise, or to assist a family member or friend. The satisfaction of provid-
ing such assistance is not taxable under any circumstances, however, and is excludible for
reasons having nothing to do with the incurrence of debt. Thus, the requirement of a debt-
related exclusion precludes COD income.
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sioner,75 a taxpayer who gratuitously assumed her husband's liabil-
ity of $100,000 was held not to incur COD income when she settled
with the bank for $50,000, because she originally received nothing
of value for her assumption of the debt.76 According to dictum in
Rail Joint, if a taxpayer promises to make a charitable contribu-
tion, and after a change of heart is forced to pay part of the debt
nonetheless, COD income should not be incurred for the cancelled
balance.7
Although no reported authority is on point, it is reasonably clear
that a tortfeasor should not incur COD income from compromise
of a final judgment of damages for a personal injury, again because
the tortfeasor has received no loan proceeds.7 8 If it is argued that
the tortfeasor may have enjoyed the pleasure of speeding, or a val-
uable saving of time, it may be answered that neither type of bene-
fit is taxable under any circumstances, and so their exclusion from
income was not caused by an offsetting debt.79 The requirement of
7' 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956), acq. in part, 1958-2 C.B. 4, nonacq. in part, 1958-2 C.B. 9.
76 It has been questioned whether this should perhaps have been recharacterized as a
borrowing of cash by the wife in order to pay down the husband's loan. See Bittker & Lok-
ken, supra note 29, at 1 6.4.2. Perhaps so, but this seems not easily distinguishable from the
case of the accommodation guarantor in the preceding note. In any case, Bittker & Lokken
do not go so far as to suggest that the accommodation guarantor in Aftergood should be
subject to a similar recharacterization.
" 61 F.2d at 752. Under current I.R.C. § 108(e)(2), the COD would not be taxable be-
cause payment of the charitable pledge would have given rise to a deduction. If the charita-
ble pledge would not have provided any tax benefit when paid, however, if for example, the
taxpayer's standard deduction would have exceeded itemizable deductions, the hypothetical
would regain its force.
78 Income treatment would also lead to the bizarre paradox that for any given compro-
mise amount, the larger the judgment against the tortfeasor, the greater the "gain" for tax
purposes. The same paradox arose in Zarin. According to the government's theory, the more
Zarin lost, the more taxes he owed. The error here is to treat a mere avoidance of loss as if it
were taxable gain. If it were, an insurance company's payment of a judgment pursuant to a
liability policy would be taxable to the insured. If the idea is pursued further, gain might be
created by escaping a mugger, selling stock before a crash, or changing the oil in one's car.
See supra note 73.
"' It may appear farfetched to argue that the judgment debtor has received consideration
in the form of, say, the joy of speeding or running red lights. And yet such exhilaration in
destructive risk-taking seems hardly distinguishable from the thrills of reckless gambling
which were implausibly labeled income from "consumption" by Professor Shaviro, supra
note 32.
Apart from appeals to psychic consumption, it is true that speeding saves time, and pro-
verbial that time is money. The tortfeasor might be viewed as making a cost/benefit calcula-
tion of the time saved versus the discounted probability of fines or accidents, and as en-
joying utility of some sort if the calculation is correct. This may be a perfectly reasonable
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a debt-related exclusion is not met.80 Similarly, no COD income
should arise from cancelled debts which were incurred for "moral"
consideration, as in the venerable case of Webb v. McGowan,"1 or
by reliance of the promisee, as in the immortal decision Hamer v.
Sidway.e2 No authority is reported treating such questions.
A more perplexing tax question is raised by a debt which previ-
ously had been discharged in bankruptcy and is revived by a new
promise to pay. Whether cancellation of such a reaffirmed debt
should result in COD income would appear to turn upon the con-
troversial question whether enforceability arises principally from
the promise itself, or from the past consideration for the underly-
ing debt (or portion thereof) which is revived by the promise.8 3
analysis, but it is not a ground for taxing COD.
8o Another application of this principle seems to have been overlooked in the Zarin case.
Because Zarin received only chips which could not be exchanged for cash, their sole value
lay in the chance that he might win something over and above his $3 million free line of
credit. Zarin was obligated to return that amount before keeping any winnings.
The maximum value of that opportunity is calculable. Using the best possible betting
strategy, that value was less than $200,000. See Michael Orkin & Richard Kakigi, What Is
the Worth of Free Casino Credit? (1992) (unpublished article on file with the author).
Even that $200,000 should not be taxed, however, because a mere opportunity to win
money is not taxable, with or without an offsetting debt. Even if Zarin had received his free
line of credit as a prize, or as compensation, the opportunity would not have been taxable
upon receipt, for the same reason that one is not taxed on receipt of a valuable employment
contract. The cash proceeds (if any) of both kinds of opportunity will be taxed in full when
actually received.
8' 168 So. 196 (Ala Ct. App. 1935) (promise motivated by gratitude to pay plaintiff $15
biweekly for life held enforceable where plaintiff became permanently crippled saving de-
fendant's life).
The heroic act in McGowin was surely of great value to the debtor, and if he had the
opportunity to bargain for the service, McGowin would gladly have agreed to pay for it.
That does not mean receipt of the service was an accession to wealth for tax purposes,
however, because it had no transferable value. Even if it had value, McGowin's promise, like
Webb's rescue, should probably be treated for tax purposes as a gift.
82 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (promise held enforceable where uncle promised to pay
nephew $5,000 if nephew, then 15 years old, would refrain from drinking, smoking, and
gambling until 21). The nephew's performance of the conditions had no apparent economic
value to the uncle, and so cancellation of the debt presumably should not give rise to COD
income.
Actual payment of the $5,000 should probably be taxfree to the nephew as a gift notwith-
standing the fact that payment was coerced, because the original promise seems to have
been motivated by the disinterested generosity and affection of a family member. Thus the
case is similar to the charitable pledge. See supra note 77.
83 If one believes that such contracts are enforceable largely upon the moral weight of the
promise alone, as Professors Thel and Yorio persuasively argue, then no COD should arise.
If one prefers the strict consideration view of Corbin that the enforceability of such debts
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Under contract law, the question is largely academic, because such
reaffirmed debts are enforceable in any event."' If the question is
raised in the tax context, however, this otherwise academic ques-
tion might determine whether the COD is taxable. 85 The issue has
never been litigated.86
Another question which has never been litigated is whether com-
promise of a judgment debt for overdue child support is taxable. It
seems doubtful that the support obligor has received any loan pro-
ceeds in exchange for the debt.8" A child may be more precious
than rubies and emeralds, but it is not lawful consideration, nor is
its birth taxable to anyone as income. Furthermore, one can incur
liability for child support even if the obligor is not a legal parent at
all.8" The value of child care provided by the custodial parent does
not qualify as loan proceeds to the support obligor, because the
rests essentially on the fact of past consideration (the original loan proceeds), perhaps the
answer should be yes. As to the contracts question, see Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The
Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (1992).
'" See Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 222.
88 The outcome should be in doubt only if the first cancellation had no tax consequences,
say because the debtor excluded the COD from income under I.R.C. § 108(a) and had no
attributes to reduce. If the first COD was taken into income or caused attribute reduction, it
would be taxed doubly if the same debt were to pass through the COD rules a second time.
86 A related question, also unanswered, is whether COD income arises from cancellation
of a reaffirmed debt which has been rendered unenforceable by a statute of limitations.
Here the analysis might be different, because the running of the statute does not discharge
the debt itself, but serves only as an affirmative defense against the remedy. Thus, COD
income might be appropriate. If so, the COD tax liability might be postponed forever by a
succession of reaffirmations, as long as the creditor does not abandon hope of collection and
forgive the debt or claim a bad debt deduction.
" It has been asserted unpersuasively that a defaulting support obligor should incur COD
income (and also that the obligee should be entitled to a bad debt deduction). See William
A. Klein, Tax Effects of Nonpayment of Child Support, 45 Tax L. Rev. 259 (1990). Profes-
sor Klein did not discuss the loan proceeds issue. Even before any court order, the obligor
has a support obligation which is imposed upon parents by law. A court order for child
support is in principle simply a substitute (in definite amount) for the earlier indefinite
obligation. There was no apparent consideration for the earlier obligation.
8 Under some circumstances, a promise to support cannot be avoided even if the prom-
isor establishes that he is not the father. See Hays v. McFarlan, 32 Ga. 699, 703 (1861), cited
in Thel & Yorio, supra note 83, at 1098. The enforceable debt does not replace any prior
obligation, and thus the debt rests upon the promise alone, just as in the case of a charitable
pledge.
In some states, a support obligation is placed upon step-parents even in the absence of
any express or implied promise. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in
the United States, 2d ed. (1988) at 263-64. In such situations, the support obligation arises
solely from legislative fiat, much like a tax.
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benefit to the obligor, if any, is not taxable even in the absence of
any offsetting debt.8 9 Moreover, custodial parents ordinarily do not
provide child care for the benefit of support obligors in direct ex-
change for support payments.90 The reverse is true if a parent pays
a third party for professional child care on a contractual basis.
This lack of connection between the duties of the support obligor
and obligee is analogous to a similar lack of connection between
the duties of the taxpayer to pay taxes and of the government to
provide services, which is the subject of Part B.
B. Are Tax Debts Incurred for Value Received?
The loan proceeds issue has never been directly litigated despite
the four reported cases which consider the tax effect of OIC agree-
ments. The Yale Avenue court saw that there was a possible prob-
lem of lack of consideration to the taxpayer, and cited the Brad-
ford9 l1 decision, but did not consider the issue further because it
had not been raised by the parties.95
In the following discussion, the issue is divided into two ques-
tions: (1) whether government-provided benefits may be consid-
ered a quid pro quo in exchange for tax obligations, and (2)
whether such benefits would be taxable in the absence of an offset-
ting tax obligation.
1. Taxes Are Not a Purchase of Government Services
Grandpa (to Henderson, IRS agent): Well, what do I get for
my taxes? If I go into Macy's and buy something, there it is
- I see it. What's the Government give me?
89 Custodial parents sometimes do not seek a support order from the absent parent, and
in such cases the absent parent is not taxable for the value of the child care provided by
others, and correctly so. The care is not transferable value and does not increase the absent
parent's ability to pay tax. Thus the exclusion of such benefits is not debt-related.
90 The duties are not interdependent. The custodial parent must provide care and sup-
port regardless of whether she receives payment from the obligor. Conversely, the support
obligor must pay despite the fact that he ordinarily has no right to an accounting to assure
the payments are actually spent for the child's benefit and no right to direct the custodial
parent's choices regarding the child's care.
"' Supra note 75.
" Yale Avenue, 58 T.C. 1062 n.5. Even if the issue had been raised, the correct answer
would probably have been that the equivalent of loan proceeds was in fact received through
the taxpayer's accrued deductions of the unpaid interest on the tax debts. See infra Part
III.D.2.
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From "You Can't Take it With You," by George S. Kauf-
man & Moss Hart (1937)
The government does not provide its services to taxpayers in di-
rect exchange for tax liabilities. If a taxpayer does receive specific
goods or services in exchange for a governmental exaction, pay-
ment is generally not regarded as a "tax" at all, but rather as a
distinct charge such as a user fee or special assessment. I do not
mean to suggest that all user fees and special assessments should
result in COD income if cancelled. COD income should arise only if
the taxpayer received something of commercial value in exchange
for the debt, which is by no means always the case."3
It is in the nature of a general tax that the payor receives no
exact quid pro quo: revenue is pooled for general public purposes
and it is impossible to trace or value the benefits to any particular
taxpayer. This distinction was once important for purposes of sec-
tion 164 of the Code which formerly permitted a deduction for a
" A few examples will illustrate some of the possibilities. A purchaser of stamps from the
Post Office surely receives transferable value, and if the purchase were somehow to be on
credit which is later cancelled, COD income should result. Similarly, if the taxpayer rents
parking space from a public authority on the same basis as from a private concern, COD
income should result from the one if it does from the other. Whether a city's cancellation of
parking tickets should create COD income would seem to depend in part upon whether the
parking tickets are regarded as a form of rental charge, or simply as a penalty.
Regulatory charges such as for automobile registration are less likely to resemble a com-
mercial purchase. Automobile registration, for example, is compulsory if one cannot avoid
driving, and the purchased license plates have no obvious commercial value. If such a debt
is cancelled, it should probably not create COD income for the same reason a tax should
not.
Special assessments upon real property are in principle payments for improvements to the
property which are of commercial value. And yet the property owner usually has no choice
whether to enter into the transaction, and the law does not require proof that the increase
in value of the realty is equal to the amount of the assessments. See, e.g., Simmons v. City
of Moscow, 720 P.2d 197 (Idaho 1986) (special assessments calculated by proximity to down-
town improvements a reasonable method of estimating benefits to be derived, even if bene-
fits are not immediately measurable). If an assessment is abated, COD income should only
arise to the extent full value was actually received. Even then, the purchase price adjust-
ment rule underlying I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) might arguably apply.
An interesting question would be raised by cancellation of a user fee owed to the Service
for special services, such as for a Private Letter Ruling. If this provides a valuable benefit
akin to insurance against increased taxes, or a tax attorney's opinion and indemnification,
perhaps the taxpayer receives something of commercial value. On the other hand, the need
for this "insurance" is caused entirely by the government's own hunger for revenues. The
question would be mooted by I.R.C. § 108(e)(2) to the extent the fee may be deductible.
The price adjustment rule might apply as well. No authority exists regarding this or any
other of the above questions.
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variety of state and local taxes, but not for user fees or assess-
ments. The Service has described the distinction as follows:
A tax is an enforced contribution, exacted pursuant to legislative
authority in the exercise of taxing power, and imposed and col-
lected for the purpose of raising revenue to be used for public or
governmental purposes, and not as a payment for some special
privilege granted or service rendered. Taxes are, therefore, distin-
guishable from various other contributions and charges imposed
for particular purposes under particular powers or functions of the
government. In view of such distinctions, the question whether a
particular contribution or charge is to be regarded as a tax depends
upon its real nature. If it is in the nature of a tax, it is not material
that it may be called by a different name; and, conversely, if it is
not in the nature of a tax, it is not material that it may be so
called.
A charge primarily imposed for the purpose of regulation is not a
tax, even though it produces revenue."4
This same distinction is in accord with general legal usage as
well,95 and has been the ground of court decisions outside the tax
area.
96
The usual presumption that equal value is exchanged in an
arms-length transaction does not apply to taxes, because taxes are
not paid at arms length, but under coercion. Taxpayers cannot
choose what to buy, nor how much to pay, nor even whether to
enter the transaction in the first place. Tax payments, willing or
Rev. Rul. 57-345, 1957-2 C.B. 132, revoked on its facts by Rev. Rul. 60-366, 1960-2 C.B.
63. The deduction under I.R.C. § 164 is now limited to income and property taxes.
" See Black's Law Dictionary under "Tax" where substantially the same distinction is
drawn and stated to be general usage:
"Taxes," as the term is generally used, are public burdens...without reference to
peculiar benefits to particular individuals or property. "Assessments" have reference
to impositions for improvements which are specially beneficial to particular individu-
als or property, and which are imposed in proportion to the particular benefits sup-
posed to be conferred.
Black's Law Dictionary 1457 (6th ed. 1990).
See also Richard A. Westin, Shepard's Tax Dictionary for Business 428 (1993), which
defines "tax" in part by quoting portions of Rev. Rul. 57-345, supra note 94.
" For example, the Fair Debt Collections Act (FDCA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., has been
held inapplicable to harassment of a tax debtor on the ground that the FDCA defines
"debt" as a consumer obligation to pay for goods or services which are primarily for per-
sonal or household purposes. Taxes finance general governmental functions and do not in-
volve an exchange of goods or services to individuals. See Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275 (3d.
Cir. 1980).
Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 14:153
not, provide the taxpayer with none of the rights of a purchaser.
Dissatisfaction with the government's services or lack of benefit
from them97 do not provide grounds for a refund of taxes already
paid or for an offset against past" or future taxes.9 9 Taxes are not
earmarked to the taxpayer's account and create no rights in the
expenditure of government funds. 00 The obligation to pay taxes is
entirely unrelated to the level of governmental benefits received.' 0 '
In fact, for most benefits it is irrelevant whether a person pays
taxes at all. Everyone is sheltered by the nuclear umbrella, pro-
tected by the Food and Drug Administration, and provided with
access to the federal courts and federal highways. Persons who pay
no taxes receive the same, if not more benefits than those who do,
which makes it difficult to argue that the benefits are received in
exchange for taxes. 02
One might counter that the private sector also provides exam-
ples of differential pricing for identical services where price de-
pends solely upon the buyer's income or wealth. College tuition
provides a striking example.10 It is at least arguable, however, that
97 A United States citizen who resides and is permanently domiciled abroad, and who
receives all his income from sources abroad, is taxed on his worldwide income, despite the
meager benefits, if any, the taxpayer enjoys in exchange. Cf. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47
(1924), where the Court stated somewhat implausibly that taxing power "is based on the
presumption that government by its very nature benefits the citizen and his property wher-
ever found .. " Id. at 56.
98 See, e.g., Akins v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2937 (1993) (physically and men-
tally disabled taxpayer who was robbed and stabbed through the heart in 1982 had not filed
returns since 1989 on the ground that government's negligent enforcement of criminal law
was directly responsible for the devastating attack. The Tax Court held it has no jurisdic-
tion to grant offset, and taxpayer remains liable for taxes, penalties and interest).
99 Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 128 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
.00 Id. at 118-19.
101 Allocation of the tax burden is now regarded as based simply upon ability to pay. It
was sometimes argued by early tax theorists that taxes should be apportioned according to
benefits received, but, as Henry Simons pointed out:
Where the government distributes goods and services which may be bought and
sold in the open market, pricing according to cost is feasible. Where expenditure is
made for purposes of general welfare (national defense, internal security), the benefit
principle leads nowhere at all; and, where the government undertakes deliberately to
subsidize certain classes (the economically unfit) or certain kinds of consumption (ed-
ucation, recreation), taxation according to benefit is sheer contradiction.
Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation 4 (1938).
02 Many government-provided welfare benefits are specially aimed at the poor, who are
unlikely to pay any federal income taxes.
" Tuition at private colleges is usually presented as a single price, say $20,000 per year.
But most schools also provide financial aid on the basis of need. The effect of purely need-
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all buyers in the private sector receive their money's worth none-
theless. At any of the prices tuition may command, it is still the
case that the parties engage in a voluntary exchange. Not so for
taxes, which are neither voluntary, nor an exchange.
10 4
2. Government Services Are not Otherwise Taxable
Even if taxpayers did receive full value in exchange for their tax
liabilities, COD income would still be inappropriate because gov-
ernment-provided benefits are generally not taxable and their ex-
clusion is therefore unrelated to tax indebtedness."0 5 There are sev-
eral reasons why government services are not treated as income.
Many federal services are impossible to value and to allocate to
particular taxpayers. National defense, regulatory protection, and
scientific research are obvious examples. Even if such federally-
funded programs could be valued and accurately allocated to each
taxpayer, the benefits would not be taxable under current law be-
cause they are not accessions to wealth over which the taxpayer
has dominion and control and they are not transferable or convert-
ible to money or money's worth.
Other federal benefits which could easily be valued and charged
for are free simply because Congress has chosen to subsidize them
by failing to exact a user fee. Such benefits are generally not taxa-
ble,'06 but similar benefits are not taxable in the private sector ei-
based scholarships is the same as posting a differential pricing system: tuition costs, say,
$20,000 for the well-off, $10,000 for most of the middle class, and nothing at all for the poor.
See Joseph M. Dodge, Scholarships under the Income Tax, 46 Tax Law. 697 (1993); Char-
lotte Crane, Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28 Harv. J. on Legis. 63 (1991).
A similar pattern, though less visible, may sometimes be found in charges by physicians
and hospitals. A surgeon's bill may be intended more as a first offer than as a fixed demand,
the true price being whatever the patient's insurer will actually allow. If the patient is unin-
sured, the provider will often write the bill down to whatever the patient can pay, or even
down to zero. Thus the wealthy subsidize the poor in a system of private discriminatory
pricing for medical and educational services which mimics progressive taxation.
104 Taxpayers must accept the benefits of federal expenditures as a package, and have no
choice about its contents. Each of us would surely spend the Treasury's money differently, if
we had the choice. It is doubtful that anyone but a farmer would spend billions of federal
dollars on agricultural supports whose intended effect is to raise the prices the rest of us
must pay for essential foodstuffs. See David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility:
How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation 7 (1993).
105 If most government benefits are excludible by everyone, without regard to whether
taxes are owed, the exclusion is not debt-related, and, thus, no COD income can arise.
100 The user of a free highway or bridge does not incur income merely because other roads
may charge a toll. If a token charge is required, the benefit might be characterized as a non-
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ther. For example, admission to the (government-owned)
Hirschhorn Museum is free and has obvious value, but admission
to a privately-subsidized museum which charges little or nothing
for admission does not create income simply because other compa-
rable museums may require a high admission price. 0 7
Most non-cash benefits 0 8 probably fall into the category of
"psychic" income,109 such as the feeling of comfort and security de-
rived from the government's protection. Psychic income of this
sort is not taxable because it is not an accession to economic
wealth and cannot be measured. Moreover, one cannot assume the
psychic "income" is positive rather than negative, because many
persons feel that at least some federal programs are outright harm-
ful, either to themselves, or to others, or to both.1 0
Justice Holmes' apothegm that taxes are the price we pay for
civilized society 1. suggests an argument that nonpayment of the
price should be taxable. If the enjoyment of civilized society can be
labelled "consumption," it will appear to be taxable under the au-
thority of the Haig-Simons definition of income as consumption
plus savings." 2 One might also reason directly from the fact that
taxable bargain purchase of consumption. See Dodge, supra note 32. If admission is free,
however, a different explanation is needed. A more general rationale is that such benefits
are simply gifts.
107 If one pays any part of the $ 7.00 voluntary suggested admission charge at the Metro-
politan Museum in New York City, it is deductible as a charitable contribution. Admission
to the Met is not less valuable than to the Museum of Modern Art, however, which requires
a (nondeductible) $8.00 admission charge.
108 Welfare cash benefits such as Aid For Dependent Children are taxfree because they
are payments for relief of hardship and considered to be for the welfare of the general com-
munity. Other cash benefits may be partially taxable on a means basis, such as social secur-
ity payments. I.R.C. § 86. Still other cash benefits are fully taxable, such as unemployment
compensation. I.R.C. § 85.
10" See R. M. Haig, The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects, in Readings
in the Economics of Taxation (R. Musgrave & C. Shoup eds. 1959).
"' For example, many people think nuclear weapons pose much greater hazards to life
and health than they avert. Others deplore the War on Poverty as the misguided cause of
permanent dependency and crime. Many believe that the staggeringly expensive War on
Drugs is as futile as Prohibition was, and that, like the first Noble Experiment, it has cre-
ated far more crime than it prevents. Dissidents must pay for these programs nonetheless.
.. See Compania de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
112 Not all consumption is taxable, however, despite the Haig-Simons definition of income
as consumption plus savings. Simons, supra note 101, at 50. Consumption is indirectly taxed
by taxing the earnings with which consumables are purchased. "Consumption" is not a de-
fined term in the Code, nor has it any agreed definition in the tax literature, although it is
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federal taxes are not deductible' 13 to the conclusion that taxes are
personal consumption expenses, as tax theorists have done in some
other contexts. 1 4 Consumption of goods and services for personal
purposes is not deductible because that would leave little or noth-
ing in the income tax base except savings. It does not follow, how-
ever, that just because an item is nondeductible, it is a form of
consumption. Taxes reduce disposable spending power and there-
fore reduce the taxpayer's ability to consume purchasable goods
and services. For that reason, Professor Bittker was surely correct
in concluding that taxes should not be considered "consumption"
within the meaning of the Haig-Simons definition. 1 5
Because taxes are neither consumption nor savings, the current
deduction for state and local income taxes appears fully justi-
fied."' In principle, federal taxes should be deductible for precisely
the same reason as state taxes, and in fact federal income taxes
were deductible from 1913 to 1917. The deduction was repealed in
1917 to help finance the cost of World War 1.117 The repeal became
permanent, which was perfectly sensible, but for a reason deriving
from the fundamental logic of tax, rather than from recognition
that taxes are neither consumption nor savings. Allowing a deduc-
tion for federal income taxes is circular and therefore pointless.11 8
usually employed to denote, roughly, the using up of economic resources for personal enjoy-
ment. If consumption is independent of any earnings in the marketplace it is generally tax-
free, as for example consuming home-grown produce. Similarly a bargain purchase is not
taxable, unless the bargain element is in effect a disguised transfer of earnings. See Dodge,
supra note 32.
"I See I.R.C. § 275.
.. E.g., many commentators on Zarin, supra note 32, have characterized casino losses as
"consumption," chiefly on the ground of their nondeductibility. But, if "consumption"
means a using-up of economic resources, this cannot be accurate, because nothing is used up
in gambling. There is only a transfer of money from loser to winner. In fact, if something of
value is transferred on both sides, the transaction is not gambling, because the essence of
gambling is the promise of something for nothing. See Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the
Law of Contracts § 1665 (3d ed. 1972).
"' Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits and Subsidies for Personal Expendi-
tures, 16 J.L. & Econ. 193 (1973), reprinted in Boris I. Bittker, Collected Legal Essays 431,
439 (1989).
"' Note that state income taxes are also deductible by corporations, which by definition
do not "consume" in the sense of incurring personal living expenses. See supra note 112.
"7 See Seidman, supra note 12, at 943-44 (annotations to § 1201 of Revenue Act of 1917).
See Richard C.E. Beck, The Deductibility of a Worthless Right to Contribution for
Joint Income Taxes: The Mistaken Line of Cases Under Rude v. Commissioner, 9 Va. Tax
Rev. 313, 327-28 (1989).
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The same result can be achieved by lowering the rate of tax,119
which is much simpler and easier to administer.12 °
C. Counterargument: Tax Debt as Loan From the Government
It might be argued that as long as a tax obligation remains un-
paid, the taxpayer is effectively in possession of a cash loan from
the government in the amount of the debt. This seems plausible at
first blush because the taxpayer enjoys the use of money which
ought to be paid to the government, and the taxpayer must pay
interest on the debt.12 Also, in a different context, tax theorists
are accustomed to viewing deferral of gain as the equivalent of a
loan 'from the government. These analogies are misleading when
applied to the COD question, however, and the arguments which
can be drawn from them are weak.
Deferral of a tax liability (as opposed to simple nonpayment of
taxes due) may indeed resemble an interest-free loan from the gov-
ernment insofar as the time value of money is the issue, 22 but the
119 The equivalence is precise if the taxes are paid currently as in the present system and
are deductible in the current year. If taxes are payable in the following year, as they were
before enactment of mandatory withholding and estimated payments, the equivalence is not
exact, because of possible fluctuations in the taxpayer's income between the payment year
and the deduction year, or changes in tax rates. In the long run, however, the effect would
be the same. The significance of this circularity principle for OIC agreements is explored
infra Part IV.C.
'"0 See Dodge, supra note 103, at 712 n.89. State income taxes are not deductible from
state income taxes for the same reason.
... I.R.C. § 6601. The interest is to be assessed, collected and paid in the same manner as
taxes. Also, all references to any tax are deemed also to refer to the interest imposed. I.R.C.
§ 6601(e)(1). Thus, cancellation of taxes in bankruptcy or through a tax statute of limita-
tions also cancels the interest owed.
122 Deferral of the liability itself, rather than deferral of payment, arguably does have the
value of an interest-free loan from the government if the gain "should" be taxed. Thus, for
those who believe, e.g. that unrealized gains ought to be currently taxed, the "deferral" of
gain has the value of an interest-free loan from the government in the amount of the tax on
the unrealized gain. The concept has recently found its way into the Code itself. For exam-
ple, under I.R.C. § 453A, the taxpayer is required to pay interest currently on the deferred
tax liability for gains from certain installment sales, despite the fact that the tax itself is not
due until actual receipt of the installment payments. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 495, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 926-31 (1987), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1245, 2313-1672 to
2313-1677. Section 453A was enacted to replace § 453(C), which was enacted in 1986 and
repealed in 1987.
By contrast, postponing payment of taxes already assessed and due is rarely profitable,
because in addition to statutory interest, the taxpayer will ordinarily be liable for nonpay-
ment penalties as well. I.R.C. §§ 6651, 6654.
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usefulness of this metaphor does not extend to the question under
discussion. The question for COD purposes is whether the tax-
payer receives loan proceeds in exchange for a tax debt, not
whether the debt may be postponed, or the value of such
postponement. 2 '
If existing tax debts are to be regarded as "loans" solely on the
ground of the benefit of nonpayment, it would be difficult to dis-
tinguish tax debts from other debts which clearly fail the loan pro-
ceeds test. For example, a tort judgment could be characterized
with equal justice as a "loan" to the tortfeasor as long as it remains
unpaid, because the benefit of nonpayment depends upon the in-
terest cost of delay, just as in the case of a tax debt.'" But a tax-
payer does not receive money from the government in exchange for
incurring a tax debt any more than a careless driver receives
money in exchange for incurring a liability for personal injury.
One might argue that forgiveness of tax is the equivalent of bor-
rowing money from a bank to pay the tax and then compromising
the bank debt. Compromising the bank debt would clearly create
COD income. The analogy is not probative, however, because the
transactions are not equivalent. The borrower does receive money
or money's worth from the bank, 2 ' but not from the government.
Moreover, the argument proves too much. A tortfeasor would simi-
larly incur COD income from compromising a bank debt used to
pay a tort judgment, but it does not follow that a direct compro-
mise with the judgment creditor will result in taxable COD. It will
not, because the two debts are entirely distinct.'
123 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
124 Statutory interest accrues on many judgment debts, including tort judgments. The
fact that interest may run does not imply that the obligation underlying a tort judgment is a
loan, nor should it in the case of tax debts.
12 The taxpayer receives value for the bank loan - either the cash itself, or the cash value
of the bank's payment of the tax debt. This benefit is clearly distinguishable from the bene-
fit of whatever services the government may have provided, if any, in exchange for the tax-
payer's original incurrence of the tax debt. COD income should result from cancellation of
the bank loan for a reason similar to the rationale of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
279 U.S. 716 (1929) (employer's payment of employee's income taxes held additional income
to employee). In Old Colony, the employee received value in the form of the employer's
payment of his tax debts. If a bank pays tax debts in exchange for the taxpayer's IOU, the
taxpayer is similarly benefitted and should be taxed if the IOU is later cancelled. See also
William D. Popkin, Taxing Personal Insurance: The Case of Tax Audit Insurance, 4 Va. Tax
Rev. 379 (1985) (concluding that the proceeds of audit insurance should be taxable).
11I A related objection might be raised by the fact that payment of a tort judgment with
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If there is a difference between tax debts and other debts for
which the creditor has not provided any value in exchange, the dif-
ference would appear to lie in the fact that the government's tax
claim, generally arises out of income-producing transactions which
increase the taxpayer's wealth. 2 7 One might argue that this in-
crease in wealth is the equivalent of loan proceeds. The difficulty
with this line of reasoning is that the increase in wealth derives
from the taxpayer's employer, customers or clients, and not from
the government. 128 To avoid this difficulty, one would have to ar-
gue that private gains do indirectly derive from the government,
either because the government has a kind of ownership interest in
the taxpayer's income129 or in the private property which produces
such income. 30 Such propositions are at best metaphorical. The
appreciated property would produce taxable gain to the extent of the appreciation in the
property. Extinguishment of the debt would thus be treated as an amount realized, despite
the fact that nothing was originally received in exchange for incurring the debt. This treat-
ment is not in conflict with the COD rule requiring loan proceeds, however, because the
debt is actually paid, much like the third-party payment in Old Colony. Payment of debt
with appreciated property is correctly treated as a barter, and is first parsed into a hypo-
thetical sale for cash, and then as a hypothetical payment of the cash to extinguish the debt.
The gain arises from" the first step alone. The second step, payment of the debt, is a loss,
and would be deductible if incurred in a business context. Loss treatment is perfectly con-
sistent with a no-tax result if the debt is cancelled rather than paid. See supra notes 73, 78.
", Note, however, that taxpayers incur gift and estate tax liabilities without the receipt of
any earnings or other property. The Code also imposes income taxes upon persons who ac-
quired no accession to wealth if they run afoul of a provision charging them with a duty to
pay the taxes of the true earner. For example, taxpayers are often required to pay taxes for
income earned by their spouses under I.R.C. § 6013(d) if they file jointly, or if they reside in
a community property state under the doctrine of Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (wife
held liable for one-half of taxes on husband's income in community property state). Simi-
larly, although not called a "tax," the 100% penalty against responsible persons under
§ 6672 imposes a personal liability upon a corporate officer who fails to pay over trust fund
taxes, even if the officer received no personal benefit.
" The case is not different for unpaid trust fund taxes, where it might appear that the
employer, as collection agent, acquires possession of funds which belong to the government.
It is still apparent that the employer alone is the actual source of the funds. The employer is
in effect required to collect money from itself. If it fails to do so, the employer has not
received any funds from the government or from third parties for the benefit of the
government.
"9 Thus, if the taxpayer fails to distribute to the government its rightful share of the
joint gains, the taxpayer will have received and converted the government's money to its
own use.
'30 Some philosophers believe that the community or its agent-the state-has rights to
private property which are prior and superior to any and all individual rights. The state
could, if it wanted, and as Stalin demonstrated, confiscate everything.
This collectivist vision bears little resemblance to our present constitutional system and
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government is of course not legally a partner of the taxpayer, and
it cannot acquire ownership of private property without paying
compensation. The government does not pay for its interest in tax-
payers' profits"' because that would defeat the purpose of taxa-
tion. Taxpayers provide money to the government, not the other
way around. That is the purpose of taxes.
A taxpayer who enjoys relief under an OIC agreement does not
avoid repayment of anything, but rather avoids payment in the
first instance. Because taxes are neither savings nor consump-
tion, 132 the actual payment of taxes can be regarded as a form of
nondeductible expense which is in effect a loss. 33 Avoidance of loss
is of course economically beneficial, but it is not a form of taxable
gain. 134
D. Exceptions
Despite the conclusion that tax debts are generally not incurred
for value, there are two exceptions: (1) where assumption of a third
party's tax debt is a condition of acquiring property, and (2) where
the tax benefit rule applies to cancellation of previously deducted
items such as unpaid interest on the tax debt.
1. Receipt of Assets as Loan Proceeds: Denman Tire & Rubber
Co.
In Denman Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner,3 5 the Sixth
much less to our historical one, but that has not prevented academic tax thinkers from
making use of the idea. For example, Henry Simons, the most influential of all American tax
theorists, wrote in connection with his argument that gifts ought to be taxed as income:
"[t]he whole return from property is, in a sense, a gift from the community." Simons, supra
note 101, at 134. If the entire return on property belongs to the community, the community
must in some sense own all "private" property.
"' The government's contribution to private enterprise, both employers and employees, is
the same as it is to tax-exempt organizations and to persons who pay no taxes; viz. the
familiar government-provided benefits of defense, highways, courts, and the like. This infra-
structure may be a necessary precondition for commerce and wealth production, but it does
not provide the government with an ownership interest in private income or wealth.
..2 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
133 See Clark v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq. 1944 C.B. 5 (client's reimburse-
ment from tax lawyer of taxes which were imposed solely because of lawyer's bad advice
held nontaxable return of capital replacing client's loss).
134 See supra notes 73, 78.
135 192 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1951).
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Circuit held that an OIC agreement was taxable, but the unusual
facts of the case indicate that the taxpayer probably did receive
loan proceeds. In Denman, the corporate taxpayer purchased all
the assets and assumed all the liabilities of a predecessor corpora-
tion in a bankruptcy proceeding.1 38 Among the liabilities Denman
assumed was a federal excise tax debt of $125,000, which Denman
later satisfied for $50,000 under an OIC agreement. Because as-
sumption of the tax debt was part of the price Denman paid for
the acquired assets, Denman should probably be viewed as having
received loan proceeds in the form of the assets. If so, the tax debt
should be treated just as any other purchase-money debt would be
treated in this situation. 131
For just that reason, Denman argued that it was protected by a
line of cases holding that renegotiation and reduction of purchase-
money debt does not create income, but is treated instead as re-
ducing the purchase price and basis of the assets.138 The argument
was rejected by the Tax Court, on the grounds that the govern-
ment was not the seller of the property,"3 9 and that no proof had
136 Id. Denman itself had never deducted the forgiven taxes or interest, and so, unlike the
other three reported OIC cases, the COD issue did not involve the tax benefit rule.
137 If the acquisition is taxable, for example, the tax debts assumed should provide the
taxpayer with basis in the assets, for the same reason as would the assumption of debts to
any other creditor. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (debt included in basis
where property acquired was subject to mortgage).
138 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. See also Commissioner v. Sherman, 135
F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1943) (renegotiation of purchase money indebtedness held reduction in
purchase price rather than taxable gain); Helvering v. A. L. Killian Co., 128 F.2d 433 (8th
Cir. 1942) (same).
I" Relief under current I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) requires the purchase-money lender to be
seller. Some early case law apparently imposed no such limitation. See Hirsch v. Commis-
sioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940); Fulton Gold Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 519
(1934) (mortgagee's reduction of nonrecourse debt subject to which purchaser acquired
property held not taxable). Other decisions required not only that the creditor be the seller,
but also that debt reduction must result from direct negotiations between buyer and seller
and concern the property rather than the debt. See Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth St. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1944) (questioning rationale of price adjustment doc-
trine altogether).
The seller-financing limitation is difficult to justify. Ordinarily it makes no economic dif-
ference to a buyer whether purchase-money debt is held by the seller or a third party. Note
also that a price rebate in cash is treated as a tax-free return of capital even when it is
received from a third party. See Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23 (cash rebate from manufac-
turer to purchaser of automobile not gross income, but basis in auto must be reduced).
There is no apparent reason why a purchaser for debt should not be treated in the same
way. The seller-financing limitation on price adjustments seems to remain the law, however.
See Sutphin v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 545 (1988) (prepayment discount on home mortgage
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been offered that the property had declined in value. 40 The price
adjustment issue perhaps deserved more consideration than it re-
ceived in the Tax Court's cursory dismissal.1'4
In Denman, as in Yale Avenue, it was apparently assumed by
both the taxpayer and the Service that the OIC agreement created
COD income. Denman actually reported the COD on its original
return for 1941, the year of the agreement. The COD income was
more than offset by losses, however, so that the return showed an
overall loss. In subsequent years the company became profitable,
and in 1944 it decided to amend its 1941 return by electing to re-
duce its basis in assets rather than recognize COD income. 42 This
had the effect of creating additional loss carryforwards which re-
duced Denman's taxes for 1942, and Denman claimed a refund for
that year. 4 s The Tax Court held that it was too late to make the
election, and stated that the election was intended to postpone
taxes for the year of debt restructuring, not to allow the taxpayer
to reduce taxes in later years by increasing its loss carryfor-
created COD income rather than price adjustment because lender Savings & Loan was not
the seller of the home, nor had home fallen in value to less than face amount of debt). See
also Rev. Rul. 92-99, 1992-2 C.B. 35; Richard M. Lipton, New Rulings on Purchase Price
Reductions Do Not Provide Much Relief, 78(2) J. Tax'n 68 (1993). If the home in Sutphin
had been seller-financed, the prepayment discount might have been excludible.
14 This limitation also derives from early case law. See Commissioner v. Coastwise
Transp. Co., 71 F.2d 104 (1st Cir. 1934) (negotiated purchase-money debt reduction held
taxable because value of property remained sufficient to pay debt in full); Codden Bros. Inc.
v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 393 (1938) (same). It is not easy to understand the rationale for
this limitation, but it too appears to remain the law. See Sutphin, supra note 139. A price
rebate in cash is treated as a return of capital without regard to any change in the value of
the property.
Although no proof of loss of value was offered in Denman, it is reasonable to surmise that
the assets had less value at the time of the compromise than they appeared to have at the
time of purchase, because the purchaser evidently received less income from the assets than
expected. One does not purchase income-producing assets in order to suffer foreseeable
losses.
"1 The Tax Court opinion states outright that assumption of the tax debt was part of the
purchase price of the assets. Denman, 14 T.C. at 714. As a result, this aspect of the Tax
Court decision seems to conflict with the holdings in Hirsch and in Fulton Gold. See supra
note 139 and accompanying text. The taxpayer apparently dropped this issue on appeal,
because it was not reconsidered in the Sixth Circuit's opinion.
412 Under § 22(b)(9) of the 1939 Code, a corporation could exclude COD income by elect-
ing instead to reduce the basis of its assets. See supra note 41.
"1 192 F.2d at 253. In Denman, the ultimate issue might be regarded as whether the
taxpayer should be permitted to retain live NOL carryovers to years after the OIC agree-
ment. It will be seen that all the other three OIC cases involved precisely this same situa-
tion. See infra Part V.
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wards.144  The election was unnecessary, however, if no COD in-
come arose in the first place. If the cancellation were properly
viewed as a price adjustment, as the taxpayer argued, the resulting
adjustment to basis would have had an effect identical to that of
the election.
2. Tax Benefit of Accrued Deductions as Loan Proceeds
Cancellation of a debt for an accrued and deducted item is
treated as a recovery of that item for purposes of the tax benefit
rule.145 According to Revenue Ruling 67-200,14 forgiveness of un-
paid interest which had been accrued and deducted in a prior year
is treated as COD income to the extent the deductions provided a
tax benefit. 1 7 The income was held eligible for exclusion under
section 108(a) of the Code if the taxpayer elected to reduce ba-
sis, 4 8 thus confirming its characterization as COD income. 14 9 Al-
141 Id. at 262-63. Despite the court's assertion, however, precisely such an increase in
NOLs and reduction of future taxes would have been the apparent effect of the election if it
had been timely made. The court seemed principally concerned with the fact that the tax-
payer changed its mind about how to report the COD income (whether to make the election)
using the hindsight of later years to determine which choice produced the greater tax
advantage.
14. I.R.C. § 111.
146 1967-1 C.B. 41.
... The same rule should apply to forgiven interest which was accrued and deducted on a
tax debt. This is a necessary corollary to the rule that a refund of interest on a tax overpay-
ment is income under the tax benefit rule to the extent it was deducted with tax benefit.
See Bird v. United States, 241 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1957). Treating such a refund of interest as
income results in a net refund after tax of $.66 on the dollar at a 34% tax rate, and that is
precisely the amount the taxpayer was out of pocket, assuming the deduction was enjoyed at
the same rate. Cancellation of accrued but unpaid interest should result in tax of $.34 on the
dollar, which again is precisely the amount of tax the taxpayer avoided in the deduction
year.
148 The election referred to in the ruling has since been repealed. See supra note 41. Simi-
lar elections have since been enacted, however, in 1986 for qualified farm indebtedness
under I.R.C. § 108(g), and in 1993 for qualified real estate indebtedness under
§8 108(a)(1)(D) and 108(c). See supra notes 43-44.
"I The Treasury's conclusion seems correct, but it is at least arguable that the income
might have been held to be outside the protection of I.R.C. § 108, on the ground that in-
come under the tax benefit rule is sui generis and distinct from COD income. Just such a
rule was proposed in the House bill which led to the 1954 Code, but it was dropped by the
Senate. Under the proposed House bill, a solvent debtor could elect to reduce basis rather
than recognize COD income currently, but the election would have been explicitly inapplica-
ble where the taxpayer had derived a tax benefit by deducting the debt. H.R. Rep. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1954).
Cf. the context of transfers of over-encumbered property to creditors, where the Service
has flip-flopped from its earlier position that the cancelled portion of the debt is shielded by
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though the point was not discussed in the ruling, it seems clear
that the prior tax benefit serves as the equivalent of loan proceeds
for purposes of applying section 61(a)(12). This seems correct, be-
cause the tax benefit of a deduction has exactly the same value as
an exclusion of cash from income."' 0 Thus, to the extent the inclu-
sionary side of the tax benefit rule applies, cancellation of a tax
debt apparently should be treated as income. 151
The tax benefit rule is potentially applicable to nearly all OIC
agreements involving accrual method taxpayers, because at least
some previously accrued and deducted interest on the tax debt is
normally forgiven. Three of the four reported OIC decisions in-
volved precisely this factual situation, although only one, Eagle
Asbestos & Packing Co. v. United States,152 involved an assess-
ment explicitly based upon the tax benefit rule. The rule was ap-
parently applicable in both Manhattan Soap 5 s and Yale Ave-
nue154 as well, because the 0IC agreements cancelled only those
the § 108(a) insolvency exception, to its current position that the cancellation is "gain"
rather than COD income and thus includible income even to taxpayers who are in bank-
ruptcy. See Rev. Rul. 90-16, 1990-1 C.B. 12, which announces the change of position. See
also Timothy M. Larason, Is Gain on Transfer of Property to Creditor by Insolvent Tax-
payer Subject to Income Tax?, 49 Tax Notes 1135 (Dec. 3, 1990).
1' At a 34% tax rate, an exclusion of $1.00 is worth $.34 to the taxpayer, and a deduction
of $1.00 is worth in principle exactly the same $.34. Nothing is ever quite so simple, how-
ever. For example, an exclusion may often be more valuable than an itemized deduction to
individual taxpayers, because the exclusion reduces adjusted gross income which causes
phaseouts of other deductions and exemptions under I.R.C. §§ 67, 68(a) and 151(d)(3).
"' Although both I.R.C. §§ 111 and 61(a)(12) apply to this situation, characterization of
the income as COD is narrower and perhaps more accurate because it is excludible under
§ 108(a), which applies only to COD. On the other hand, similar income was characterized
as tax benefit rule income rather than COD in Schlifke v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH)
1697 (1991) (previously paid and deducted interest held income under tax benefit rule
where interest was credited toward repayment of principal pursuant to rescission of home
equity loan under Truth in Lending Act). In Schlifke, the government assessed tax under
both theories in the alternative. After citing Zarin and commenting that the law of COD
was controversial and murky, the court applied the tax benefit rule without further consid-
eration of the COD alternative. No issue of insolvency or of other exceptions to COD was
present, however, and so it was unnecessary to decide between the two theories.
152 384 F.2d 528 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
563 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 257 (1944). In Manhattan Soap, an accrued and deducted manufac-
turers' excise tax liability together with interest totalling $319,256 was settled for a $35,000
cash payment. Both the principal and the interest were deductible.
154 58 T.C. 1062 (1972). There were two taxpayer corporations in Yale Avenue with nearly
identical factual issues. Both OIC agreements cancelled only accrued and deducted interest
and no principal. The parties failed to perceive that Eagle Asbestos was directly contrary
authority, perhaps because the assessment in that case was made under the tax benefit rule
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portions of the debts which had been accrued and deducted. De-
spite the fact that the tax benefit rule should apparently create
income to the extent of the prior deductions, in Eagle Asbestos,
the one reported decision which squarely faced this issue, the
Court of Claims rejected an assessment based on the tax benefit
rule. The decision appears to be correct, and the reasons why it
appears correct form the subject of Part IV.
IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF COD INCOME
Part A will explore some paradoxes raised by taxing OIC agree-
ments. Part B will examine the similarity between these difficul-
ties and even greater ones which would be raised by taxing other
cancellations of tax debt. Part C proposes a general explanation of
both sets of problems.
A. OIC Agreements
This Part explores three difficulties in taxing OIC agreements:
(1) it is futile if the taxpayer cannot pay; (2) if the taxpayer can
pay, it unfairly defeats expectations; and (3) even if the Service
recognizes these difficulties, it is apparently powerless to prevent
them.
1. Futility
As shown in the preceding section, income appears to arise from
an OIC agreement where the tax benefit rule applies. But the re-
sult is somewhat paradoxical, if not outright self-defeating, because
the very act of cancelling the old tax would create a new tax. If the
Service has made the best possible compromise, the taxpayer will
be unable to pay anything more than the settlement amount. Any
new tax debt presumably would be uncollectible as well and would
only provoke new negotiations and a new compromise, which in
turn would trigger a second round of COD income and a third
compromise, and so on. 155
The paradox is magnified by the fact that the less the taxpayer
can afford to pay, the greater the COD tax. For example, if the
rather than as COD income.
"' This series of compromises and taxes would go on infinitely, although it approaches a
limit of zero.
[Vol. 14:153
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taxpayer can pay only $.10 on the dollar toward the old debt, the
tax on $.90 of COD might be three times greater than the compro-
mise payment.'56 Neither Congress nor the parties to the OIC
agreement could have intended such a bizarre result.
2. Finality of OIC Agreements
An OIC agreement effects a settlement of the taxpayer's liability
which is final. The case may be not be reopened unless the tax-
payer has misrepresented its present or expected future financial
condition. 157 Treating the settlement as COD income can be
viewed as simply restoring one-third 58 of the debt which was just
extinguished, and thus as violating the guaranty of finality. 5 9
If a taxpayer who has entered into an OIC agreement is able to
pay an additional tax on COD income, that probably indicates that
the Service failed to negotiate the best available compromise. The
Service can easily negotiate access to the taxpayer's future wealth,
because the taxpayer must submit a collection information state-
ment with the OIC listing its assets, income and expected future
income. The possibility of future increases in the taxpayer's ability
to pay is a required subject of negotiation. 6 ' Compromise amounts
can be made payable over time rather than in a lump sum, 6' and
collateral agreements may be negotiated to provide that some per-
centage of any contingent or unexpected income of the taxpayer
must be paid toward the old debt in addition to the compromise
amount."16
166 Because $.90 was forgiven, the tax at 33% would be $.30, or three times the compro-
mise amount of $.10. It is perhaps unrealistic to assume such a high tax rate for a distressed
taxpayer, but even at a 15% rate, the unexpected COD tax brings the total payments to
nearly two and one-half times the maximum amount the taxpayer was deemed able to pay.
If the assessment itself was unrealistically high, the COD "gain" alone could push the tax-
payer into the highest bracket. See supra note 18.
Treas. Reg. § 1.7122-1(c); I.R.S. Manual §§ 57(10)1.4, 57(20).1 (Feb. 26, 1992).
158 The exact amount depends on the rate of tax applicable to the COD.
, I.R.S. Form 656, Offer In Compromise, makes no mention of and gives no protection
from this possibility.
100 See I.R.S. Doc. No. 7917 (2-92), supra note 16, at 13-19. See also I.R.S. Manual
§ 57(10)(13).(12) (Feb. 26, 1992).
181 See I.R.S. Manual § 57(10)6.4 (Feb. 26, 1992).
162 I.R.S. Manual § 57(10)(15). Under the new program of streamlined procedures, how-
ever, collateral income agreements are disfavored because they are thought to require com-
plex monitoring. I.R.S. Doc. No. 7917, supra note 16, at 21. Where feasible, lump sum settle-
ments are preferred over installment plans. For this purpose, the taxpayer's estimated
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If the Service miscalculated the taxpayer's financial situation de-
spite its ample powers of discovery, assessment of COD income to
correct its mistake may appear to be an unfair reopening of the
final settlement through a back door. This would defeat the tax-
payer's expectations, if not its contractual rights as well. The ques-
tion then arises whether the agreement itself can be construed as
preventing the tax, and if not, whether the parties might prevent
the tax by explicit agreement.
3. Can COD Income be Avoided by Agreement?
In Eagle Asbestos, the Court of Claims rejected an assessment
for COD income under the tax benefit rule as violative of the OIC
agreement on the ground that the apparent intention of the parties
was to extinguish all obligations to the government for the years
covered.1 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed the fact
that the government was in possession of the taxpayer's returns
and must have known of the taxpayer's accrued deductions."' If
the parties had intended the compromise agreement to disallow
the taxpayer's prior accruals, the agreement would have said so ex-
plicitly. Because it did not, the court concluded that the parties
must have intended to leave the deductions undisturbed. 165
ability to make payments over time is generally treated as an asset which may be valued by
discounting to present value. Id. at 19. The period to consider for this asset is the remaining
collection period or five years, whichever is less.
163 348 F.2d at 531-33.
14 Id. at 531. Eagle Asbestos had accrued interest on the cancelled debt, and the accruals
resulted in NOLs which the taxpayer applied to offset income in years following the OIC
agreement. The assessment would have created income in the year of the compromise,
which in turn would have used up the NOLs. The actual assessment was for years after the
OIC to which the NOLs were carried forward.
' Id. at 531. As an alternative ground of decision, the court asserted that it was impossi-
ble to determine which part of the lump-sum settlement, if any, was allocable to cancelled
interest, and thus whether any interest was cancelled at all. Under I.T. 3852, 1947-1 C.B. 15,
a lump-sum settlement for a deficiency including penalties and interest was ruled a pay-
ment in lieu of the liability, and that no part of such payment was deductible as interest.
This ruling was reversed and superseded by Rev. Rul. 73-304, 1973-2 C.B.42 which acqui-
esced in the reasoning of Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 420 (1969)
and 53 T.C. 275 (supplemental opinion 1969). According to Rev. Rul. 73-304, compromise
payments are to be applied first to tax, penalty, and interest, in that order, for the earliest
taxable period, then to tax penalty, and interest, in that order for the next succeeding taxa-
ble period, until the payments are absorbed. If the compromise payment is less than the
total liability for taxes and penalty, however, no amount will be allocated to interest. These
rules are now stated on I.R.S. Form 656, Offer in Compromise, at clause 6. Under these
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The result in Eagle Asbestos seems correct, but the court's rea-
soning is not altogether satisfying. 166 If COD income is in fact re-
quired, even an explicit agreement to waive the tax would probably
be ineffective for two reasons. First, the Service is not authorized
to compromise liabilities under section 7122 of the Code unless the
taxes are already assessed and due.167 Because tax on the COD
would not be due until the following year, the tax would not be
assessable until then. Section 7122(b) requires the Service to file a
statement of the amount of tax assessed and the amount compro-
mised."' If the amount compromised includes forgiven taxes on
COD, that amount cannot be determined at the time of the OIC
agreement, and must await the end of the year of the OIC agree-
ment, when the taxpayer's remaining items of income and deduc-
tion for that year become known.
Second, the Service has no apparent authority under any other
Code provision to waive a future tax which would otherwise be re-
quired.6 9 Thus, even if the taxpayer did obtain an explicit protec-
tive clause, it would not be binding unless on an theory of estoppel,
and estoppel is very rarely applied against the government.1 7 0 The
current rules, interest is in effect cancelled first.
' Even if the Service had the authority to waive COD income, the facts do not indicate
that it was exercised. The parties simply failed to consider the issue. This failure almost
certainly rested on an unstated mutual assumption that no income arises. If the Code does
require income treatment, however, the parties' mistaken assumption to the contrary cannot
prevent a subsequent correct assessment of the tax due.
117 See Barnes v. United States, 201 Ct. Cl. 879 (1973) (compromise agreement has no
effect upon tax items of future tax years). See also Kennedy v. United States, 965 F.2d 413,
420 (7th Cir. 1992).
-68 I.R.C. § 7122(b) requires the General Counsel to file with the Secretary a statement of
the amount of tax, interest, and penalties assessed, the amount actually paid, and the rea-
sons for the compromise. Such a report obviously cannot be filed with respect to liabilities
which have never been assessed. By implication, it follows that Congress did not intend to
authorize compromise of unassessed liabilities under § 7122.
' By contrast, taxpayers are not bound to exercise their rights against the government,
and may waive them voluntarily with or without an agreement. For example, a taxpayer is
not bound to claim a deduction merely because it may legally do so, and for that reason it
may also bind itself to waive its rights to deductions or other tax attributes by contract.
70 Estoppel is traditionally said to be ineffective against the government on the ground of
separation of powers. An administrative agent of the executive branch has no authority to
contravene the will of Congress. On the other hand, the courts have occasionally protected
taxpayers from unconscionably harsh consequences of good-faith reliance upon erroneous
official assurances. See, e.g., Shuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962). See also
Theodore Lynn & Mervyn Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as Applied
Against the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 Tax L. Rev. 487 (1964); Coin-
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Service can bind itself to the future tax treatment of a contem-
plated transaction by means of a Private Letter Ruling (PLR),'
or by a closing agreement, 7 ' but as noted above, it has no author-
ity de jure to waive a tax which would otherwise clearly become
due.17 3 On the other hand, the Service can be regarded as having
de facto the power to make law in taxpayers' favor, because the
favored taxpayers have no incentive to contest the result. As long
as other similarly situated taxpayers are treated with consistent le-
nience, no one would have standing to compel the Service to im-
pose the tax. 1 4 Closing agreements and PLRs are costly and time-
consuming, however. Even assuming the Service would be willing
to grant them, their use would undercut the purpose of the new
streamlined OIC procedures. Also, reliance on PLRs or closing
agreements, like mere forbearance, would leave the Service free to
adopt the "correct" position at any time for other taxpayers, pro-
vided that it did so consistently.
75
The COD problem would thus appear to require a legislative so-
lution such as enactment of a new exception under Code section
108 for OIC agreements, or a grant of authority to the Service to
waive COD in appropriate situations. The need for such legislation
seems doubtful, however, when other forms of statutory tax relief
ment, Unauthorized Conduct of Government Agents: A Restrictive Rule of Equitable Estop-
pel Against the Government, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1026 (1986).
It does not appear that liability for COD which is correctly assessed would rise to the level
of unconscionable injury under the case law. Estoppel has usually been applied where the
tax would have been avoidable if the taxpayer had not abandoned a valid defense in reliance
upon the official assurance. See, e.g., Walsonavich v. United States, 335 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.
1964). A mutual mistake of law is generally insufficient ground for estoppel. See Badger
Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 725 (1963). Moreover, good-faith reliance might be
difficult to establish because a taxpayer who solicits a no-tax clause is obviously aware of
the issue and may well be better informed on the legal question than the government agent.
In any event, ad hoc reliance on estoppel can hardly provide a general solution to the COD
problem.
171 If the taxpayer has made no material misrepresentation of fact, a PLR will not be
retroactively revoked "[e]xcept in rare or unusual circumstances." Treas. Reg.
§ 601.201(l)(5). Other taxpayers may not rely on the PLR, however. Tress. Reg.
§ 601.201(l)(1).
1" I.R.C. § 7121.
173 Apparently, the only way the Service could assure taxpayers of a no-tax result is by
issuing the taxpayer in good faith a (mistaken) PLR or closing agreement.
'71 See Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service to Be
Consistent?, 40 Tax L.Rev. 411, 429 (1985).
'15 Id. at 430.
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are considered. In the following two sections, a general solution to
the problem will be developed on the basis of a principle of tax
logic.
B. Other Statutory Cancellations of Tax
If an OIC agreement is taxable, there is no obvious reason why
tax forgiveness via other provisions of the Code should not be tax-
able as well. 176 This would have consequences even more surprising
than for OIC agreements. For example, if Code sections 61(a)(12)
and/or 111 applied to the ten-year statute of limitations on collec-
tions after assessment,17 the statute would in effect extinguish
only two-thirds of a tax debt, because it would reinstate one-
third 17a of the debt for a new life of ten years as a tax on COD.
170 Some tax debts may also be discharged outside the Code in bankruptcy proceedings.
For example, income taxes assessed more than 240 days before filing a petition in a Chapter
7 proceeding may be dischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1988).
Although the insolvency exception under I.R.C. § 108(a) precludes current taxation of
COD, a different question lurks behind the exclusion. Under I.R.C. § 108(b), insolvent tax-
payers must reduce tax attributes by the amount of COD excluded under § 108(a). If can-
cellation of a tax debt is not income in the first place, it was not excluded under § 108(a),
and the taxpayer should not be required to surrender tax attributes. This issue has appar-
ently never been litigated, and has not been mentioned in the tax literature.
... I.R.C. § 6502. Statutes of limitation in the Code extinguish the taxpayer's liability
altogether, unlike most other statutes of limitation which only bar the creditor's remedy
when raised as an affirmative defense. See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 29, 113.2.
The running of a statute of limitations is often said to be a triggering event for COD
income. It is not entirely clear that this is correct, however, because a creditor in this situa-
tion has probably abandoned hope and effectively forgiven the debt long before the running
of the statute, so that any COD should have been taxed in an earlier year. All the reported
litigation concerns the recurrent situation of estates of decedent shareholders who had taken
out loans from their own corporations many years earlier. See, e.g., Estate of Bankhead v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 535 (1973); Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1547
(1978); Miller Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 191 (1981). When the creditor corporation
(still owned by the family of the decedent) fails to make a claim against the estate within
the very short (usually six-month) nonclaim statute, COD income is taxed to the estate. If
the purported loans were not evidenced by written agreements and required no interest, it
might be more realistic to regard them as dividends instead. See Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(m).
It is noteworthy that the Service does not allow the corporate creditor a bad debt deduction
in this situation, despite the "debt" treatment of the shareholder. See Bankhead, 60 T.C.
535. If the advance was a dividend, however, it should have been taxed when paid, and it
may never be taxed if the statute of limitations on assessments runs before audit of the
estate.
"' The precise amount would depend upon the tax rate applicable to the COD income. If
the taxpayer is in the 31% bracket, each dollar of cancelled tax debt would create a new
liability of $.31, and so in effect only 69% of the tax debt will have been cancelled by the
statute of limitations.
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After ten years of interest compounding on the remaining third,
two-thirds of that sum would be cancelled, and so on every decade
forever until the taxpayer's death. The statute would never com-
pletely eliminate a tax liability, just as the Zeno's arrow never
reaches its goal. This result is obviously absurd because it would
defeat Congress' intention to provide repose." 9
The three-year statute of limitations on assessments under Code
section 6501(a) would be subject to the same problem if an unas-
sessed tax liability constitutes "indebtedness" within the meaning
of Code section 61(a)(12). There is at least some reason to think
that it does.18° If so, the statute would never run on liabilities
which have not been assessed.' This would confer significant new
powers upon the Service because no tax year would ever finally
close. As a result, assessments might be made at any time for taxes
due as far back as 1913. Very great burdens would be placed on
taxpayers, who would be forced to retain their records forever.181
The effect would be equivalent to repealing the statute of limita-
tions altogether and replacing it with a reduced rate of tax which
declines with the age of the "closed" year. On the taxpayer's side,
at least, income treatment would completely defeat Congress' in-
tent to provide repose and freedom from the threat of prosecution
of stale claims. 183
The Service has of course never made an assessment based on
either statute of limitations, and it is difficult to believe that any
' See United States v. Updike, 281 U.S. 489, 496 (1930).
1so For purposes of transferee liability under I.R.C. § 6901, at least, it is clear that a
transferor is "liable" for unassessed taxes. See Saltzman, supra note 11, at 17.03.
'8' Every three years two-thirds of the unassessed liability plus interest would be can-
celled under I.R.C. § 6501, and the remaining third would be given new life under
§ 61(a)(12). The Service could always assess the remaining tax (plus interest and penalties)
as new COD income in the current year.
182 In one respect, this may seem to be less of a departure from current law than it first
appears. Under current law, it is sometimes necessary to examine long-closed years for spe-
cific items such as earnings and profits, basis and other tax benefit items which may affect
the tax for a later year. Auditing a closed tax year to see if a liability should have been
assessed is perhaps no different in principle. On the other hand, the field of potential in-
quiry would become limitless if any and all items of any and all closed years were to become
fair game.
'"' See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 (1946). The taxpayer
would never enjoy repose, but the government would. Under I.R.C. § 6511(a), taxpayers
would still be barred from bringing a suit for refund more than three years after filing.
Thus, the statutory scheme of limitations would become a one-way street in favor of the
government.
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judge would uphold such an assessment because the result is ab-
surd. 184 The absurdity is even more obvious than in the case of an
OIC agreement, but nothing in the Code itself appears to prevent
Code sections 61(a)(12) and/or 111 from applying to both situa-
tions alike.
In theory, the same issue also arises when Congress cancels a tax
debt by means of a private bill. Congress occasionally uses private
bills to reverse a court judgment or other final tax determination
in order to provide ad hoc tax relief.185 Congress has sometimes
provided similar relief through a narrowly drawn retroactive provi-
sion of a revenue act which may or may not have general applica-
tion."'6 Congress could easily insert a clause in private bills to pre-
vent further tax, but it has never done so, undoubtedly because
Congress did not expect tax relief to be taxable.
C. The Circularity Principle
Taxing statutory tax relief is inherently self-contradictory, which
is obvious from the examples of the preceding section. Although an
OIC agreement resembles a private compromise of debt to which
Code section 61(a)(12) would normally apply, an OIC agreement is
also a statutory method of granting tax relief in the same sense as
184 Legislative intent is often said to be irrelevant if the plain meaning of a statute is clear
on its face. On the other hand, if the "plain meaning" of I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) leads to an
obviously absurd result, its meaning may not be so plain after all. See Bittker & Lokken,
supra note 29, at 1 4.2.2.
18 Congress has occasionally done so in order to mitigate the harsh effects of joint and
several liability under I.R.C. § 6013(d). For examples of such private laws waiving statutes
of limitations and res judicata, see Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint
and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 317, 349
n.140 (1990). For accounts of the problems raised by such legislation, see also Note, Tax
Equity and Ad Hoc Tax Legislation, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1971); Stanley S. Surrey, The
Congress and the Tax Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 1144 (1957).
188 For example, Congress provided additional innocent spouse relief in § 6004 of the
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342,
which was retroactive for any taxpayer who filed before January 1, 1985. The relief was
termed a "transitional rule" and seems aimed at one taxpayer, but apparently because of
the outcry over "rifle-shot" transitional rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the provision
is drafted broadly enough so that it should apply to at least some other taxpayers. See Beck,
supra note 185, at 350 n.141.
On the question whether such legislation is constitutional, see Lawrence Zelenak, Are
Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Legislation Constitutional?, 44 Tax L. Rev.
563 (1989) (arguing that they probably are constitutional).
196 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 14:153
a statute of limitations, and it would be just as illogical to require a
tax on one as on the other. In fact, if the law did require a tax on
OIC agreements, the Service would want the power to waive the
tax, and logically should always exercise it."s7
To illustrate, consider the following example. A taxpayer owes
$200 in back taxes, but is able to pay only $100 over the next three
years. If the Service accepts an offer of $100 and COD income
arises, the taxpayer will owe an additional $33 in the following
year. This result is futile if the taxpayer cannot pay the additional
tax. If the taxpayer can pay $133, the Service's determination that
the taxpayer can pay only $100 must be wrong. No additional reve-
nue is produced unless the Service has made an error. On the other
hand, if the Service agrees to leave the taxpayer with funds to pay
the COD liability, the compromise amount should be only $50. In
that case, $150 of debt will be cancelled, and the COD liability for
the following year will $50, which equals the taxpayer's remaining
ability to pay. 88 But, a $50 payment is not the best compromise
available if the taxpayer can in fact pay $100. It would be poor
business judgment for the Service to reject $100 in hand in order
to collect $50 now and a doubtful promise of $50 later, and it
would be contrary to Congress' intention that the Service should
collect the maximum amount available. In short, taxing OIC agree-
ments would probably raise no more revenue than not taxing them,
and perhaps less. This paradoxical result resembles a proof a con-
trario. Assuming the premise to be true leads to an apparent con-
tradiction, and the premise must therefore be false: no COD is cre-
ated in the first place. 89
87 Thus, the Eagle Asbestos court's inference that the parties did not intend COD in-
come to arise does not rest on the particular facts of that case, as the court seemed to think,
but rather on the fact that the parties to any OIC agreement would logically waive the tax.
188 Where c = the amount of the compromise, a = the total amount the taxpayer can
afford to pay, r = the expected rate of tax applicable to the COD income, and d = the tax
debt to be compromised, the compromise amount is determined as follows:
c = a - r(d)/(1 - r).
Using the numbers in the text, c = 100 - .33(200)/(1 - .33). At lower tax rates, the difference
in the amount of the compromise is less dramatic, but the principle remains the same. If the
expected tax rate is 15%, for example, and the other numbers remain the same, the compro-
mise amount should be $82 in order to leave the taxpayer with $18 to pay the tax on $118 of
COD income in the following year.
189 Thus, a legislative solution to the problem cannot be found by delegating to the Ser-
vice the authority to waive COD income in appropriate circumstances. If the Service had
such authority, it should always make the waiver, as shown above.
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The paradox in the above example resembles a variety of
problems which can arise when the outcome of a tax rule is treated
as if it were a taxable event. An example of this principle has al-
ready been noted in connection with the deductibility of income
taxes: although a deduction appears justifiable, it is pointless to
allow it because it is circular in effect. 19 ° In general, tax detriments
are not treated as losses'91 and tax benefits are not treated as
gains. Without this rule, similar problems would arise on the in-
come side where a tax rule seems to yield an item which otherwise
resembles gross income. For example, a tax credit is not treated as
income even though a tax credit is a valuable receipt which other-
wise appears to be squarely within the usual definitions of gross
income. 92 If the credit were treated as income, that would reduce
the value Congress apparently intended for the credit. 93 If Con-
gress wanted this result, it would presumably have enacted a
10 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
19 A tax detriment (such as a penalty) which merely increases the amount of liability
would not deductible by a cash-method taxpayer in any case until the tax is actually paid,
and an accrual-method taxpayer would not be permitted to accrue the deduction until eco-
nomic performance. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(6). Thus, on the tax detriment side, the
circularity principle boils down to the prohibition against deducting federal income taxes
under I.R.C. § 275.
192 For example, the historical rehabilitation credit under I.R.C. § 47 permits the tax-
payer to reduce its taxes by 20% of the amount expended. The credit is a direct reduction
of the taxpayer's tax liability; it is earned by performance of the conditions under § 47; and
it is the economic equivalent of a check from the government. The credit appears to be an
accession to wealth which is clearly realized by and under the control of the taxpayer, and it
is not excluded by any specific provision of the Code. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
It might be countered that items entering an initial computation of tax liability, such as
tax credits, stand on a different footing from rules governing a later recomputation of liabil-
ity such as OIC agreements or the 10-year statute of limitations. A tax credit arguably does
not reduce a fixed liability already owed, but merely enters the computation of what will be
owed. On the other hand, this distinction seems less persuasive if the benefit of an over-
looked tax credit or deduction is obtained by amending a prior return to claim a refund. In
that case the refund would also be a redetermination of a prior "fixed" liability.
193 Congress has in fact limited the value of investment tax credits by requiring the tax-
payer to reduce basis by the full amount of the credit. I.R.C. § 50(c)(1). The rationale for
this rule has nothing to do with treating the credit as income, however. Basis reduction (by
50% of the credit) was first enacted in 1982 in order to overcome the effectively negative
rate of tax on income from depreciable property under the 1981 rules, so that the combina-
tion of ACRS cost recovery and investment tax credit would be no more generous than
expensing at a 10% after-tax discount rate. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982 36 (Comm. Print 1983).
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smaller credit in the first place.19 4 Income treatment would also
create tax accounting complications. 1 5
The nontaxability of credits and other tax benefits can also be
explained by the fact that they are effectively equivalent to a tax
refund, and a tax refund is always excludible as a return of capi-
tal.196 The exclusion for tax refunds (and other tax benefits) is in
turn arguably based upon the nondeductibility of income taxes, be-
cause a recovery of capital is excludible only in case it was not
deducted with tax benefit. 97 In the final analysis, however, Code
section 275 is itself based upon the larger principle of avoiding
circularity.
This same circularity principle should prevent Code sections
61(a)(12) and 111 from applying to OIC agreements and other stat-
utory tax relief. Tax provisions which are designed to determine
the amount of liability are structural rules of the tax system. These
structural rules cannot themselves be treated as taxable events
without interfering with their purpose. Taxing tax relief is just
such a circularity, and permitting it would have the effect not only
of complication and inconvenience, but of outright self-
contradiction.
The confusion over COD in the case law seems to have been
19' On the other hand, it is conceivable that Congress might intend a credit to be taxable
so that its value will diminish for high-bracket taxpayers. When Congress desires such a
result, however, it always uses explicit statutory language to cap or phase out the credit as
income increases. See, e.g., the credits for dependent care under I.R.C. § 21; for the elderly
and disabled under § 22; and for earned income under § 32.
1"' For example, if a tax credit (or deduction or exclusion) were income, it would be un-
clear whether it should be taxed in the year that it is "earned," or (if different) in the year
in which the economic benefit is actually enjoyed through tax reduction.
"I If the taxpayer omits a claim of deduction, credit, or exclusion, and subsequently
amends the return to claim a refund, the refund is clearly a return of capital. It would be
very odd to argue that claiming such benefits in the correct year is income, if the tax could
be avoided simply by claiming them in a subsequent year instead.
For the same reason, cancellation of a wrongly assessed tax is necessarily excludible. If it
were not, the taxpayer could pay the tax instead, and sue for a refund which would be
excludible. Transactions which are economically equivalent should be taxed alike.
"" I.R.C. §§ 111, 275. Taken together, these rules in effect require taxes to be paid out of
after-tax dollars. Put another way, the income tax is not imposed upon net income, but
upon income grossed up to include the tax liability. This system is far simpler than the
alternative of allowing a deduction for income taxes. I do not claim that this solution is
inevitable, however. As pointed out supra note 117 and accompanying text, income taxes
were in fact deductible from 1913 to 1917. Note also that gifts are not grossed up to include
the gift tax.
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caused by the dual nature of OIC agreements. On the one hand, an
OIC agreement resembles any ordinary compromise of debt be-
tween a financially troubled debtor and a creditor attempting to
make the best of a losing situation. From this perspective, the
usual rules for COD income seem applicable. This has masked the
fact that an OIC agreement is also a statutory procedure which
determines the amount of the taxpayer's liability.1 98 When it is rec-
ognized that the OIC procedure is itself a structural tax rule in the
same sense as a statute of limitations, the circularity principle
should apply.
One might counter that an OIC agreement is not a structural tax
rule because an agreement requires a discretionary act of the Ser-
vice, unlike the ten-year limitation on collections which seems to
apply automatically. On closer inspection, however, this distinction
appears illusory. The usual reason the Service allows the ten-year
statute to run is that it has decided that collection is unlikely and
that levy or suit would be futile. In short, it is almost always a
discretionary act of the Service which permits enjoyment of the
statutory relief, just as in the case of OIC agreements.
In the final analysis, there is no more reason to tax an OIC
agreement than the running of a tax statute of limitations. No ex-
plicit statutory authority provides for either exclusion, but none is
needed because these exclusions are implicit in the logic of
taxation.
V. THE OIC CASES REVISITED: TURNAROUNDS AND LIVE NOLs
A. Past and Future Deductions: The Ulterior Purpose
All of the taxpayers in the four reported cases emerged from an
OIC agreement with live NOLs which they used to offset substan-
tial unexpected post-agreement income. The taxpayer in Manhat-
tan Soap became very profitable within a year after the OIC agree-
ment, and was able to reduce its taxes otherwise due by means of
loss carryovers which survived the OIC agreement. The same was
true in Eagle Asbestos. 99 In Yale Avenue as well, it appears that
1 See supra note 7.
199 348 F.2d at 529-30. In Eagle Asbestos, the 1951 OIC agreement cancelled interest
which the taxpayer had accrued and deducted in 1948. It appears that the 1948 deduction
did not reduce the taxpayer's taxes, but instead had the effect of creating a loss carryfor-
ward to the years 1956, 1957 and 1958. The assessment at issue was for these later years.
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the deductions had created or increased NOLs which remained
alive after the OIC agreement. 00 In Denman, the taxpayer's elec-
tion to reduce basis would have permitted it to apply loss carryfor-
wards to offset post-agreement income, and the assessment for
COD income had the effect of disallowing the NOLs.
Under Code section 111(c), if a deduction creates or increases a
loss carryforward of the taxpayer, the NOL is treated as a tax ben-
efit despite the fact that the deduction has not yet provided any
reduction in taxes and will do so only in the future when it may be
applied to offset future income.20 1 All three tax benefit cases in-
volved precisely this situation: the taxpayer had accrued and de-
ducted, but not yet paid interest on the cancelled debt, and the
accruals created NOL carryforwards (rather than reductions of
current tax) which remained alive at the time of the agreement.2"2
The Service can easily require taxpayers to reduce NOLs by ne-
gotiating a collateral agreement as part of the OIC agreement. Spe-
cial tax forms exist for this precise purpose. 20 3 The common de-
nominator of all the reported OIC cases appears to be that the
Service miscalculated by failing to require the taxpayers to reduce
200 58 T.C. at 1069-70. The taxpayer claimed the deductions in the year preceding the
compromise when it had no income. No mention was made of a refund of tax from a car-
ryback of the loss to a previous year, and in any case such a refund would surely have been
applied against the outstanding tax debts. Thus, it appears that the accruals created NOLs
which remained alive, just as in Eagle Asbestos and Manhattan Soap.
20I I.R.C. § 111(c) was originally enacted as § 111(d) by BRTA 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589,
§ 2(c), 94 Stat. 3389, reprinted in 1980-2 C.B. 607, 611. The Senate Report explains that
the measure "clarifies current law." S. Rep. No. 96-1035, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 630 (1980),
reprinted in 1980-2 C.B. 620, 630. I.R.C. 111(c) appears to reverse rather than clarify prior
law, however. See Rev. Rul. 58-546, 1958-2 C.B. 143 (deductions which increased an
unexpired NOL did not give rise to a tax benefit). See also Robert A. Bergquist & Alfred C.
Groff, Reorganizing the Financially Troubled Corporation After the Bankruptcy Act of
1980, 36 Tax L. Rev. 517, 526-27 (1981).
202 This situation will continue to arise because the economic performance rules under
I.R.C. § 461(h), enacted in 1984, do not prevent an accrual method taxpayer from deducting
interest as it accrues over time regardless of whether the interest is actually paid. Treas.
Reg. § 1.461-4(e).
202 There are two such standard forms. I.R.S. Form 2261-C Collateral Agreement -
Waiver of Net Operating Losses, Capital Losses, and Unused Investment Tax Credits, ex-
plicitly provides for the taxpayer's waiver of some or all of its existing net operating losses.
I.R.S. Form 2261-A Collateral Agreement - Future Income - Corporation, includes under
clause (3) a specific waiver of all existing net operating losses so that they cannot be used to
offset any future income. Form 2261-A is used when the taxpayer promises to pay, in addi-
tion to the fixed sum compromise amount, contingent amounts of future income for a num-
ber of years.
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their existing NOLs.2 °4 When the taxpayers unexpectedly became
profitable, the Service apparently regretted its earlier lenience and
attempted to recoup whatever it could from a bad bargain by as-
sessing additional taxes for COD (or tax benefit rule) income. The
Service seems to have assessed COD income selectively for this
purpose, and for this purpose alone.20 5 In short, the Service's ad
hoc assessments for COD income appear to have been a ploy for
the ulterior purpose of extricating itself from an unfavorable agree-
ment, or from a mistake of its own making. The COD assessments
had precisely the same effect as reopening the agreements to de-
mand nunc pro tunc a waiver of the NOLs. Thus, the Court of
Claims' view in Eagle Asbestos seems confirmed that at bottom,
the Service was simply attempting to reopen a final agreement.
The Service's inaction in this area since Yale Avenue seems to
indicate that the Service also believes Eagle Asbestos is correct.206
Until the Service decides to publish its policy, however, taxpayers
must live with the threat that the Service may at any time decide
to employ its COD theory again. Because taxation should adminis-
tered by clear and general rules rather than by ad hoc measures
applied selectively, the Service should formally repudiate Yale
Avenue.
204 In Denman, the facts were somewhat different because the taxpayer initially reduced
its existing NOLs voluntarily by taking the COD into income, and later attempted to create
additional NOLs by amending its return to exclude the COD. See supra note 142 and ac-
companying text. However, it appears that there was no collateral agreement applicable to
future income, and if the Service had negotiated such an agreement, the litigation caused by
Denman's unexpected turnaround might have been avoided.
25 This despite the fact that the Service's assessments used broad language, and appear
on their face to apply to all cancellations of tax debts. It seems probable that many corpora-
tions entering into OIC agreements had accrued and already enjoyed the benefits of interest
deductions, but none has ever been assessed. As a practical matter, there would be no rea-
son to do so, because the prior tax benefit is water under the bridge, and cannot affect the
taxpayer's present ability to pay.
200 A senior Service official (who requested anonymity) has confirmed this. He stated on
the telephone that an IRS internal memorandum of law concludes that Eagle Asbestos is
correct, and that on the basis of that memorandum, it is now Service policy not to assess
additional tax upon 0IC agreements. He refused to send a copy of the memorandum, how-
ever, which he stated is for internal use only.
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B. A Proposal to Reduce Tax Attributes
1. OIC Agreements
There is no apparent reason why loss carryforwards should not
always be reduced in exchange for cancellation of tax debts under
an OIC agreement, regardless of the origin of the losses. An NOL is
in effect an obligation of the government to reduce future taxes of
the holder. When the government cancels a taxpayer's delinquent
tax obligations, equity would seem to require cancellation of the
government's future obligations to the taxpayer as well.20 7
The setoff should probably not be dollar-for-dollar, as it is under
Code section 108(b) for cancellations of non-tax debts, because
that would provide the government only $.34 of benefit in ex-
change for giving up its claim to a full dollar. The reduction of
NOLs should be three-for-one 0 8 if the dollar values are to offset
equally.20 9 The setoff should be calculated at the highest marginal
rate in order to prevent any possible overtaxation. 10 Thus, if the
maximum rate in effect for corporations is 34%, it would be rea-
sonable to reduce NOLs by three dollars for each dollar of debt
207 The setoff might also be viewed as an equitable relaxation of the timing requirements
under I.R.C. § 172. If the taxpayer has unused loss carryforwards and at the same time also
owes back taxes, it ordinarily means that a timing rule prevented the income underlying the
tax debt from offsetting the loss. If the loss could be carried back forever, rather than only
three years as under the current rules, the loss could be netted against the prior income to
extinguish the debt.
20' The correct ratio depends on the taxpayer's expected marginal rate. If the taxpayer is
expected to be in the 15% bracket, perhaps the NOLs should be reduced at the rate of 6.7-
for-one.
209 This ignores the time value of money, which is also relevant. If the taxpayer is an
individual who has large capital loss carryovers which are deductible only at the rate of
$3,000 per year, it may take many years to enjoy them, unless the taxpayer has offsetting
capital gains. See I.R.C. § 1211(b).
10 Unfortunately, it is often difficult to estimate the dollar value of NOLs with precision.
On the other hand, nearly all required adjustments reduce the value of NOLs. It is unlikely
that an NOL carryforward can ever be worth more than the value of a current deduction at
the highest marginal rate, unless rates are later raised. The value of NOLs is affected by the
taxpayer's bracket, by the timing of their use, and also by the fact that, for individuals at
least, they may be "absorbed" by intervening years without providing any tax benefit at all.
See I.R.C. §§ 172(b)(2), (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.172-4.
A more exact way of calculating the setoff might be to require the taxpayer to use up
NOLs against post-agreement income according to existing rules, but without allowing any
actual deductions for them until the amount of extra taxes paid because of the foregone
deductions equals the taxes forgiven under the OIC agreement. This method would be more
accurate, but has the disadvantage of requiring extensive recordkeeping and monitoring.
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cancellation under an OIC agreement. The proposed rule should
also apply to capital loss carryforwards, suspended passive losses
and investment interest deductions, charitable contribution carry-
overs and the like, all of which represent claims for future tax
reduction.211
The proposed rule should apply as the default rule just in case
the OIC agreement does not itself contain an explicit collateral
agreement to reduce tax attributes. This would protect the Service
from the kind of surprises or mistakes which provoked the re-
ported litigation. The proposed rule would give the Service more
than it asked for under its COD income theory, and without dis-
torting the law. The rule could be implemented by regulation be-
cause the Commissioner already has discretion to demand a reduc-
tion of tax attributes in negotiating OIC agreements.
2. Statute of Limitations on Collection
The foregoing analysis suggests a more difficult question:
whether attribute reduction should be required in exchange for re-
lief under the ten-year statute of limitations. Legislation would be
required to institute such a rule because the Service has no author-
ity to demand such reduction as it does for OIC agreements. The
circularity principle should prevent COD or tax benefit rule in-
come in this situation.212 Nevertheless, the same equitable argu-
ment that was made for OIC agreements can also be made in favor
of setting off NOLs against taxes cancelled under Code section
6502. The repose Congress intended to afford through Code section
6502 would not necessarily be undercut by such a rule, because a
present setoff of attributes would not ordinarily require investiga-
211 An alternative solution might be to require the taxpayer to surrender all such tax
attributes in exchange for an OIC agreement, even if the value of the attributes exceeds the
amount of tax forgiven. Because the OIC is intended to wipe the slate clean of past taxes,
this arguably should imply that the debtor's entire tax history should be wiped clean as
well. This fresh-start-for-fresh-start approach has the advantage of simplicity, and avoids
the need for estimating the current value of NOL's and other attributes.
On the other hand, where the taxpayer has suffered further losses for years subsequent to
those governed by the OIC agreement, the effect of this rule might be too harsh. This objec-
tion would be overcome if the clean-slate rule applied only to those attributes which were in
existence at the end of the last year governed by the OIC agreement, rather than to all
attributes existing at the time of the OIC agreement itself. This might not fully compensate
the government, but it is perhaps the best compromise.
212 See supra Part IV.C.
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tion of the taxpayer's liability for the ten-year-old assessment. All
that would be required is reduction of any existing NOLs (in an
appropriate amount) to the extent of the cancelled liability. In
cases where liability is clear because the discharged tax debt was
self-assessed or the taxpayer agreed to the assessment, it might
well be appropriate for Congress to consider enacting such a rule.
In other cases, however, setoff would probably be inappropriate
because it may not be clear that the discharged liability was ever
in fact owed. Even if the taxpayer never contested the assessment,
the taxpayer still retains the right to pay the tax at any time and
to sue for a refund to contest the asserted deficiency. If the matter
is never adjudicated, liability would remain doubtful, and resolu-
tion of the matter after running of the statute would violate Con-
gress' guarantee of repose.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER COD ISSUES
A. A New Exception?
The conclusion that statutory cancellation of a tax debt does not
create COD income even where the tax benefit rule would apply
rests ultimately on the common sense principle that it would be
self-defeating. This principle has potentially wide application. A
great variety of non-tax debts may by cancelled or rendered unen-
forceable by debtor or consumer protection statutes and under
common law as well. If all such debt cancellation is taxable, the
intended relief would be undercut to the extent of the tax imposed.
The problem implicates the entire panoply of state and federal
debtor protection law.2" 3 Most such legislation is designed either to
prevent or redress debtors' losses due to creditors' overreaching, 1"
3 This potentially includes a great variety of state and federal statutes in the areas of
consumer protection, professional ethics and licensing, usury and truth in lending, statutes
of fraud, statutes of limitation, anti-deficiency legislation, statutes protecting minors and
incompetents, and of course bankruptcy. A complete treatment of the interplay of COD
income and consumer or debtor protection law is far beyond the scope of this article. The
general problem has received no scholarly recognition at all, nor have particular instances
been discussed, except in the bankruptcy area. Very little litigation has been reported in-
volving such cases, and even then, the larger issue has gone unrecognized, as in the Zarin
decisions and commentaries. See supra note 32.
" The New Jersey Casino Credit Act which prohibits extension of excessive gambling
credit belongs in this category. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12-101(b), (f) (West 1988). The
purpose of rendering such debts unenforceable is to prevent casinos from encouraging corn-
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or simply to alleviate hardship, and generally is not intended to
enrich the debtor.215
Section 61(a)(12) of the Code should not be applied literally and
automatically where it might conflict with the purpose of statutory
debt relief. In most such cases a no-tax outcome may be indepen-
dently determined either by an absence of loan proceeds received,
or by the disputed debt doctrine.2 16 In close cases, however, some
weight should be given to the intended purposes of the relief stat-
ute in determining whether taxation is appropriate.2 17 This is not
to say that federal tax law should automatically defer to non-tax
policy, but rather that tax rules should not be applied mechani-
cally as if the Code were a closed system operating in a void.
In any event, the example of tax debts provides a very clear in-
stance where the reason for cancellation must be regarded as de-
terminative of whether COD should result in income. This conclu-
sion is directly contrary to the literalist view that the reason for
cancellation of a debt is irrelevant to the question of its taxability.
A strictly literal interpretation of Code section 61(a)(12) without
regard to the circumstances of cancellation can easily lead to re-
sults which are obviously unfair and unintended.218
pulsive gamblers to ruin themselves. See Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc. v. Salamone, 429 A.2d
1078, 1080 (N.J. Super. 1981). It makes little sense to tax the relief, because the gambler will
still be ruined, except now by tax debts rather than casino debts. The taxes assessed against
Zarin, together with interest and penalties, actually exceeded his original debt to the casino.
Zarin, 916 F.2d at 111-12.
..6 Exceptions might be appropriate where the legislation prescribes a penalty which does
clearly enrich the debtor, such as where the principal of a usurious loan must be forfeited by
the lender to the debtor. Strictly speaking, this should probably not be regarded as an ex-
ception to I.R.C. § 61(a)(12), but rather as a taxable penalty payable by "spurious" COD.
See supra note 29.
210 Both of which applied in Zarin.
217 In Zarin, such an inquiry into purpose of the statute which voided Zarin's debt would
have made it much easier to see that the exceptions for lack of loan proceeds and for dis-
puted debts were both applicable. That purpose was to prevent casinos from overreaching
compulsive gamblers. See supra note 214. Recognition that state law viewed the receipt of
excessive credit by a compulsive gambler as worthless, if not outright harmful, would have
led easily to the conclusions that the dispute was valid, and that Zarin received nothing of
taxable value.
218 Consider the following hypothetical example: a person is erroneously convicted of a
felony which he did not commit and spends years in prison before the error is discovered
and the prisoner is pardoned by the governor. The governor's pardon is interpreted as re-
leasing the prisoner from the following debts imposed by state law: (1) a fine imposed for
the felony, (2) restitution of money to the victim of the felony, (3) restitution of the state's
expense for the public defender who originally represented the prisoner, and (4) restitution
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B. Equal Treatment for Solvent and Insolvent Taxpayers
The principal reason for the Service to compromise a tax debt is
the taxpayer's inability to pay. The same rationale underlies the
insolvency exception under Code section 108(a) which excludes the
COD income of taxpayers who are insolvent or bankrupt. This sim-
ilarity invites comparison of the two relief provisions. Most OIC
agreements are probably made with taxpayers who are insolvent in
the sense that their liabilities exceed the value of their non-exempt
assets both before and after the agreement. However, OIC agree-
ments can be and often are made with taxpayers who are techni-
cally solvent, as was the case in three of the four reported cases
examined in this article. The Service's reason for compromising a
tax debt despite the taxpayer's solvency is just the same as that of
any other creditor, namely, to make the best possible settlement. If
the taxpayer's assets are for some reason unavailable to satisfy the
debt, they are quite sensibly ignored.
This policy stands in stark contrast with the insolvency excep-
tion codified under Code section 108(a). Bankrupt and insolvent
debtors may exclude COD from income, although at the price of
attribute reduction under Code section 108(b). To the extent the
taxpayer is or becomes solvent as a result of debt forgiveness, the
exclusion provided by Code section 108(a) is inapplicable, and the
COD income must be taxed currently. Creditors may be expected
to strike the best possible compromise, however, which makes it
unlikely that the debtor will have any foreseeable liquidity to pay
tax on the COD.
This suggests that the current rules under Code section 108(a)
are overly stringent. Where creditors have forgiven uncollectible
debts in order to realize the best available settlement, or to facili-
tate the rehabilitation of a financially troubled taxpayer, it seems
reasonable to avoid imposing a current tax regardless of whether
the taxpayer is technically solvent. This would be realistic, and
would also remove some difficult obstacles faced by taxpayers con-
templating workouts outside of bankruptcy. If the taxpayer is in
doubt whether it can prove that its liabilities exceed the value of
its assets, which is a difficult and frequently litigated question, the
to the state for the costs of confinement. No COD income can result from discharge of the
first two debts because the prisoner never received anything of value in exchange. But the
prisoner did receive valuable legal services and costly room and board. Should he be taxed?
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taxpayer has an incentive to resort to formal bankruptcy proceed-
ings for the sole purpose of avoiding current taxes on COD.219 Once
in bankruptcy, the technical question of solvency becomes irrele-
vant because all COD is excludible. This incentive to resort to for-
mal bankruptcy seems undesirable from a policy point of view if
the creditors can otherwise negotiate a settlement out of court. For
the sake of both simplicity and fairness, it might be better to treat
all cases of inability to pay alike, without regard to technical sol-
vency. That would entail extending the relief Code section 108(a)
to all such debt cancellations.220
21 A person need not be insolvent for eligibility to file a voluntary petition for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13. Bankruptcy relief is available whether or not the
debtor can prove its insolvency. See Thomas D. Crandall, et al., Debtor-Creditor Law Man-
ual % 12.03[1](1991).
"2 Equal treatment for troubled but solvent taxpayers would mean subjection to the at-
tribute reduction rules of current I.R.C. § 108(b), however, and these rules are also prob-
lematic. The policy reasons for attribute reduction under current § 108(b) appear question-
able because the deferred tax arises from creditors' agreements or bankruptcy relief itself,
rather than from earnings. Attribute reduction in this situation might be viewed as a ques-
tionable toll charge for the privilege of availing oneself of such relief. Moreover, the loss of
NOLs in this situation is often at the expense of creditors, because NOLs are valuable assets
which might otherwise be employed directly or indirectly to reduce creditors' losses. See
generally Bergquist & Groff, supra note 201 (arguing vigorously that the BRTA 1980 re-
forms which introduced NOL reduction were a mistake because they interfere with the fresh
start policy of bankruptcy law). See also Phelan & Sharp, supra note 40.
If attribute reduction is justified for non-tax debts at all, perhaps it would be better to
return to the rules in effect before 1980, and require only reduction of basis down to a limit
of fair market value, or to the amount of the taxpayer's remaining indebtedness, whichever
is greater. See supra note 41. This would reflect the pre-Kirby Lumber view that COD is a
form of unrealized appreciation. See supra note 22. It might be better still to limit COD
income to the original facts of Kirby Lumber and to require no basis adjustment at all in
uncollectibility cases, as in Germany and the U.K. See supra note 27. An enormous simplifi-
cation would be achieved by repealing other attribute reductions. The rules for determining
whether NOLs may be preserved in corporate bankruptcy and workouts are complex, uncer-
tain, and constantly changing. Vast amounts of specialized legal labor are consumed in ef-
forts to plan for the survival of corporate NOLs. One of the principal reasons for the insta-
bility of the rules is the lack of clear consensus about what, if anything, should be a fair tax
price for insolvency relief.
Under these circumstances, it might be better to let simplicity and administrability decide
these issues, rather than abstract theory and a vain search for the "right" answer. The ad-
vantages of simple, predictable and unchanging rules might easily outweigh any revenue
losses. Moreover, the revenue losses might be less than first appears. To the extent the
debtor's continued use of NOLs permits larger payments to creditors, that in turn should
reduce the creditors' bad debt deductions.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Compromising a tax debt should not create COD income because
no loan proceeds are received in exchange for incurrence of tax
debts. Where some part or all of the cancelled debt has been ac-
crued and deducted, however, the tax benefit rule does appear to
create COD income. Nevertheless, this result must be rejected as
unintended and contrary to the purpose of granting tax relief. The
Service should repudiate Yale Avenue as erroneous so that taxpay-
ers may enjoy certainty as to the tax consequences of OIC
agreements.
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